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PRIVATE LAW
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DANIEL E, MURRAY*
INTRODUCTION**
It is intercsting to observe that the cases decided in the last two years
have shown an increase in quantity and complexity when compared with
the preceding two year period. This increase is in part, of course, due to
a constantly increasing population and the existence of the district courts
which have been prolific in their work. However, a closer analysis of these
cases reveals the very distressing fact that approximately one-half of these
cases were decided on procedural rather than substantive grounds. Many of
the cases reveal that the chancellors, as well as the attorneys, were either
completely ignorant of, or blandly disregard some of the most funda-
mental rules of procedure. The sua sponte actions of some of the chancellors
in amending decrees and orders without the slightest attempt to give the
adversely affected party an opportunity to be heard can only be described
as a type of "Judge Roy Bean justice." When it is remembered that
clients have to pay additional attorneys' fees and court costs to correct
these judicial faux pas, it would behoove the State Bar Association to
conduct more institutes on procedure for the judges and lawyers. I an
attempt to assist in this problem, the author has added a separate section
on procedure and, wherever possible, procedural questions have been
discussed throughout the various headings of this article.
MARRIAGE
Common law marriages
Since the last survey, the courts decided only three cases dealing with
common law marriages. In the first case,' the district court affirmed the
Florida Industrial Commission in its affirmance of the findings of the
deputy commissioner that a common law marriage had been proved. The
court stated that the deputy's position is somewhat analogous to that
of a chancellor in that his findings are entitled to great weight and should
not be set aside unless there appears no competent substantial evidence to
support them. The decision was barren as to any factual discussion. In the
* Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
** The material herein surveyed includes the statutes enacted by the 37th Florida
Legislature (1959l session) and the cases reported from 96 So.2d 139 through 113
So.2d 224.
I. Fagler Funeral Service v. Schulz, Fla. 97 So.2d 347 (Fla. App. 1957).
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second case,2 the district court held that the alleged wife failed to prove
the existence of a common law marriage. The evidence disclosed that
the couple had "held themselves out as man and wife," however, the
alleged wife's testimony seemed to indicate that there was an agreement
to be married in the future rather than an agreement per verba de praesenti.
The third case 3 was also barren of any factual discussion and simply held
that a common law marriage had been proved. Query: Why do the courts
bother to write opinions without a discussion of the pertinent facts?
Legislation
The Legislature had taken a belated (although incomplete) step
forward in an act which requires the registration of common-law marriages
by both parties with the county judge in any case where welfare payments
for dependent children are involved. The Act wisely provides that lack of
registration shall not affect others not a party to such common-law
marriage; it is limited to cases involving the alleged husband or wife, or
both.4 It is a pity that the Act did not require the registration of all common-
law marriages by the alleged husband and wife as a condition precedent
to any action between the spouses, or by one of them against the estate
of the other or against third parties, either private or public.
Ceremonial Marriage
In the Perkins case,5 a lothario married three women without going
to the bother of divorcing his first two wives. His first wife also "married"
another. His second "wife" claimed workmen's compensation benefits in
opposition to the claim of the first wife. The Industrial Commission's
ruling in favor of the first wife was affirmed by the district court. Certificates
from the Mississippi and Florida Bureaus of Vital Statistics and two
Mississippi chancery courts, which showed an absence of a divorce decree
dissolving the deceased's first marriage, effectively destroyed the usual
presumption in favor of the validity of a second marriage. It is somewhat
surprising that the court did not consider the fact that the first wife's
second "marriage" would create a presumption that her first marriage
(to the deceased workman) had been dissolved by divorce.5 The first wife's
testimony that she had not divorced or been divorced by her first husband
does not seem consistent with her subsequent marriage to another.
2. Van Derven v. Van Derven, 105 So.2d 805 (Fla, App. 1958).
3. Horning v. Horning, 107 So.2d 756 (FIa. App. 1958). The case of Smith v.
Smith, 108 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1959) involved an admittedly meretricious relationship, a
"turpentine camp wedding." The case is an interesting ineffectual attempt to establish a
constructive trust by the "wife" in the "husband's" property.
4. Ch. 59-472, S.B. No. 170, 37th General Session, Florida (1952).
5. Perkins v. Richards Constructors, Inc., 111 So.2d 494 (Fia. App. 1959).
6. E.g. Teel v. Nolen Brown Motors Inc., 93 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1957).
[VOL. XlV
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ANNULMENT
In a case of apparent first impression,7 the district court ruled that
an annulment may not be granted upon the uncorroborated testimony of
the plaintiff. The facts (which were not recited by the court) were "of an
indelicate nature" and the contention of the plaintiff-wife that "corro-
boration is neither possible nor required" was summarily brushed aside by
the court. Inasmuch as some sexual nonfeasance or malfeasance was
apparently involved, it is to be wondered how corroboration could be
secured. With the possible exception of doctors, who could testify? Is
not the court enunciating a cast-iron rule that may be unworkable as
well as unjust?
JURISDICTION, DOMICILE AND VENUE FOR DIVORCE
Proof of residence
In accord with the case of Pepper v. Pepper," the district court
held that "The plaintiff's testimony, corroborated by three witnesses"
that he had resided in Florida for more than two years together with his
continued residence for a year since he testified should serve to "confirm
or disaffirm the validity of his claim of residence."" The district court
has frowned upon "leading questions of the most obvious nature" utilized
to establish residence for divorce. The court dismissed the suit because
the plaintiff's witnesses although testifying in 1955 that he was present
ninety days before the filing of the suit in 1953, also stated that he was a
resident of Florida for a period of nine months. "Certainly nine months
prior to August 6, 1955, could not be construed by the wildest stretch of
the imagination as having been prior to September 23, 1953." 10
In Vega v. Vega" a divorce was entered in favor of the husband
based upon his sworn complaint, affidavit and testimony that he did not
know his wife's "address or whereabouts or where she went to. . . ," and
that no children were born of the marriage. Six months later the wife
attacked the divorce alleging that she was living with him at the time he
had filed his divorce action, that a child was born of the marriage, and
that the divorce was obtained by fraud and perjury. The wife's testimony
was "unchallenged." For some incomprehensible reason the chancellor
refused to vacate the divorce and he held the wife and her attorney in
contempt of court! The district court, in a very stinging opinion, remanded
the case "for the purpose of conducting a proper and orderly hearing on
the motion to vacate ... " and vacated the order of contempt.
7. Pickston v. Dougherty, 109 So.2d 577 (Fla. App. 1959).
8. Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1953).
9. Fenton v. Fenton, 100 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 157).
10. Baker v. Baker, 105 So.2d 506 (Fla. App. 1958).
11. Vega v. Vega, 110 So.2d 29 (Fla. App. 1959).
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The somewhat nebulous concept of "domicile" rcquired for divorce
received further illustration in the Wethersetin case. 12 A couple had lived
in.Florida since October, 1951. In 1957, the wife filed suit for divorce
and shortly thereafter left to undergo medical treatment in Illinois. She
returned to Florida for the hearing at which time the chancellor dismissed
the cause for lack of jurisdiction. The district court reversed holding that
"the record of the testimony before the lower court showed no abandonment
of her Florida domicile by the plaintiff." This ruling appears to the author
to be a too extreme effort of the court to "find domicile." According to
the final decree, the wife had no relatives in Florida; her apartment lease
had been cancelled; her relatives would have to be in constant supervision
of the wife. Finally, "She has made no arrangements to live in Florida
and by her own testimony has no such plans. She has no property in Florida
outside of an automobile." If "the best proof of one's domicile is where
he says it is,"' 3 then it would seem that the wife's testimony that she had
made no arrangements to live in Florida would have negatived any
presumption that the original domicile continues until a new one is
definitely acquired. 4
PROCEDURE-ESTOPPEL BY JUDGEMENT AND RES JUDICATA;
VACATING OF DECREES, APPEALS, ETC.
Conflicts between Florida and New York courts
The Linguanti case'5 could be accurately labeled a "strategic nightmare."
The husband filed suit for divorce against the wife in Florida. Before she
answered, she filed suit for divorce in New York. She was awarded counsel
fees and suit money in the Florida case. Later she petitioned the New
York court to enjoin her husband from proceeding with his Florida
action. The New York trial court declined to do so; she appealed and a
restraining order was issued by the New York appellate court. The wife
then applied to the Florida court to stay the proceedings until the New
York appellate court had completed the cause. The Florida court declined
to stay the cause and the wife appealed. The district court held that the
chancellor had not abused his discretion in refusing a stay. From the
wording of the opinion, it would appear that the court did not look too
kindly upon the wife's efforts to interfere with a Florida court which did
have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action.
Jurisdiction obtained by mail.
In the Marshall case' (which will be subsequently discussed) the
supreme court decided that in proceedings supplementary to divorce brought
12. Wetherstein v. Wetherstein, 111 So.2d 292 (Fla. App. 1959).
13. Frank v. Frank. 75 So.2d 282, 286 (Fla. 1952), cited by the court.
14. 8 FLA. LAw & PRAC. Domicile § 19 at 110 (1958), cited by the court.
15. Linguanti v. Linguanti, 96 So.2d 906 (Fla. App. 1957).
16, Marshall v. Bacon, 97 So.2d 252 (FRa, 1957).
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to collect delinquencies in the payment of alimony and support money,
when the court had expressly retained jurisdiction over these matters,
jurisdiction over the defendant could be obtained by service by mail
provided he was given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the decree was adversely modified. In addition, when the defendant
filed a special appearance, but then asked for affirmative relief (even
though it was allegedly done in response to a question from the chancellor),
he was subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
The Marshall case should be compared with the Koseh case. In Kosch,
the wife brought proceedings to increase the support provisions of a
property settlement which had been confirmed by a divorce decree. The
decree provided that the court retained jurisdiction of the cause "to enforce
the provisions contained in said agreement." (Emphasis added). Copies of
the motion for an increase were mailed to the local attorney who had
represented the husband in the first suit, to the husband in South Carolina,
and to the American Arbitration Association which had arbitration jurisdic-
tion under the terms of the agreement. The district court distinguished
these facts from the Marshall case by holding that a proceeding brought
to increase an alimony award is a new proceeding and service of process
must be made upon the husband before the court has jurisdiction over
him which would be sufficient to enable the court to enter an in personam
decree valid under the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitu-
tion. Upon appeal, the supreme court reversed stating that the case was
controlled by the Marshall case. This was not a new suit; it was merely
supplementary to the original suit.' 7
The Schraner case' 8 completes the picture partially painted by the
Marshall and Koseh cases. In Schraner the ex-wife petitioned the court
to modify a final decree of divorce by "withdrawing the husband's right
of visitation and temporary custody." The final decree did not expressly
retain jurisdiction over the cause. A copy of the petition and a notice
of hearing were mailed to the ex-husband in Indiana ten days prior to the
date of the hearing. The district court ruled that jurisdiction to modify a
divorce decree as to custody of minor children is not dependent upon an
expressed reservation in the final decree for, independently of any statute,
a court of chancery has inherent jurisdiction to control and protect infants
and their property. Therefore, it was not necessary to serve new process
and "the informal notice actually served on the defendant met the
requirements of due process."
A guardian of an incompetent cannot bring divorce proceedings
in behalf of the incompetent.
The district court has aligned Florida with the weight of authority
by holding that a guardian has no right to continue a divorce action
17. Kosch v. Kosch, 106 So.2d 600 (Fla. App. 1958).
18. Schraner v. Schraner, 110 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1959).
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instituted by an incompetent prior to his being adjudicated incompetent in
the absence of appropriate legislation.19 It is to be noted that the Scott
case,20 decided in 1950, held that the guardian could not institute a suit for
divorce in behalf of the incompetent. The district court noted that the
Scott case used the language "instituted" and "maintained" which seems
to be consistent with the present case. The writer may be accused of legal
heresy in submitting that the pious platitudes used by the court (and
by courts cited as precedent) are unrealistic. It is no doubt true that "a
marriage relationship, as the foundation of home and family, should not
be abrogated without adequate cause." However, where is the "home"
when one spouse is insane? Why would a wife, for example, be so zealous
in protecting this "home"? Could the answer lie in the fact that she
would be entitled to support from his estate during his lifetime and for
a share (if not all) of his property at his death? This may be labeled a
cynical approach, but platitudes should not be used to conceal reality.
Estoppel by judgment and res judicata.
It is, of course, error to raise the affirmative defenses of estoppel
by judgment and res judicata by a motion to dismiss. Being affirmative
defenses, they can only be raised by an answer, cross-claim, or counter-
claim, or a combination of the foregoing.2 1
A husband brought suit for divorce based upon extreme cruelty aud
adultery. The wife pleaded res judicata in that in a prior separate main-
tenance cause brought by the wife with the husband counter-claiming
for divorce based upon extreme cruelty, the court had found for the wife.
In the separate maintenance proceedings, the husband had introduced
testimony relative to the wife's alleged adultery. However, he had confined
his pleadings to the question of cruelty and no amendments to conform
to the evidence were made. The district court, in affirming the chancellor,
held that since no charge of adultery was pleaded by the husband in the
separate maintenance suit nor could it be ascertained that the chancellor
had considered the adultery testimony in finding that the wife was not
guilty of extreme cruelty, the ground of adultery was not barred by res
judicata or esto~pcl by judgment. Of course, the question of cruelty was
barred by the former determination which was adverse to the husband,22
In the Berman case29 the husband filed suit for divorce based upon
extreme cruelty and habitual indulgence in a violent and ungovernable
temper. The wife pleaded res judicata based upon a New York decree
19. Wood v. Beard, 107 So.2d 198 (Fla. App. 1958).
20. Scott v. Scott, 45 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1950).
21. Stone v. Stone, 97 So.2d 352 (Fla. App. 1957), and Chambers v. Chambers,
102 So.2d 171 (Fla. App. 1958).
22. Shirley v. Shirlcy, 100 So.2d 450 (Fa. App. 1958).
23. Berman v. Berman, 103 So.2d 611 (F1a. App. 1958).
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of separation from bed and board which was predicated upon: (1) cruel
and inhuman treatment, (2) failure to provide for her maintenance and
support and (3) abandonment. The lower court determined that estoppel
by judgment applied even though apparently it was not pleaded by the
wife. The supreme court stated that estoppel by judgment was not
applicable because, the husband withdrew his defense to the New York
action in the midst of the hearing, hence "In these circumstances it cannot
be said that the 'points and questions' presented in the instant suit for
divorce were 'actually litigated and decided' in the New York proceeding."
In addition, neither res judicata nor estoppel by judgment may of necessity
be applicable if the degree of proof required for victory in the first action
is greater than the degree of proof required for victory in the second
action. Therefore, the degree of proof required in New York to sustain
a charge of "cruel and inhuman treatment" must be proof of "either
actual violence committed with danger to life, limb or health, or a reason-
able apprehension of such violence." This is, of course, a much greater
degree of proof than is required in Florida to prove charges of extreme
cruelty or ungovernable temper. Hence, estoppel by judgment was not
applicable under either theory.
The cause celebre of Astor v. Astor24 has made its inevitable return25
to an appellate court in an effort to unscramble the seeming marital maze.
The husband first married Gertrude and later secured a Mexican divorce.
He then married Delores. Subsequently, Gertrude attacked the Mexican
divorce in the New York courts which held the divorce to be invalid.
However, before the New York courts had ruled, the husband was ordered
to pay separate maintenance to Delores by the Florida courts. The
husband, in the Florida separate maintenance suit, attacked his own
Mexican divorce. His attack was denied on the grounds of estoppel. Later,
the husband filed suit in New York against both Gertrude and Delores
asking the court to decide which of the women Was his wife and for
relief against the Florida decree. The New York court refused to decide,
holding that Delores' separate maintenance decree was res judicata and
even though Florida must accord the New York decree full faith and
credit, it is not bound to accord it any more credit than it has in New
York which also held against the husband on the grounds of res judicata.
It would appear that the husband has no other alternative but to continue
the doubtful pleasure of supporting two "wives."
The dichotomy between res judicata and estoppel by judgment was
further illustrated in the Stone case.20 A husband sued his wife for divorce
24. Astor v. Astor, 89 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1956).
25. Astor v. Astor, 107 So.2d 201 (Fla. App. 1958). See generally, Comment, Full
Faith and Credit: Extraterritorial Effect of Custody Decrees, 13 U. MIAMi L. REv.
101 (1958)Y
6. Stone v. Stone, III So.2d 486 (Fla. App. 1959).
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in Florida alleging habitual indulgence in a violent and ungovernable
temper and desertion. The wife counterclaimed for separate maintenance
alleging desertion. Prior to this action, the husband had sued his wife
for divorce in Ohio alleging cruelty, while she had cross-claimed alleging
desertion and seeking separate maintenance. The Ohio Court denied relief
to either party. The Florida trial court entered a summary decree in
favor of the wife holding that the husband's Florida action was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. The district
court reversed, ruling that since the husband's Florida action did not
involve the same grounds as were present in the Ohio action, the rule
of res judicata was improperly applied. And, inasmuch as the wife failed
to introduce any testimony from the Ohio action showing that every
point and question involved in the Florida action was actually litigated
and determined in the Ohio action, she had failed to carry the burden
of proof which was incumbent upon the party asserting the doctrine
of estoppel by judgment. It would seem that if the wife can show (at
further hearings) that the matter adjudicated in the Ohio case furnished
complete coverage and proof as to the essential elements of the charges
of ungovernable temper and desertion now asserted by the husband, her
claim of estoppel by judgment would be eventually successful.
Chancery court ha9 jurisdiction to enter a money judgment based upon
foreign judgment for delinquent alimony and child support.
A chancery court may enter a money judgment based upon a judgment
of a sister state for delinquent alimony and support payments over the
contention that the suit was one in debt cognizable only in a common
law action. The court reasoned that it would be a strained interpretation
to hold that this was a debt action "rather than one to procure and
enforce by equitable processes a decree for accrued alimony and support
for the former wife. . . ." In addition the court considered that to hold
that only the common law side of the court had jurisdiction would be
"depriving equity of its inherent power of enforcement by attachment and
contempt."
Appointment of special matters.
The Nystrom case,28 a procedural "jig saw puzzle," is too lengthy to
discuss fully. The main ruling was that it was error to appoint a special
master without notice and an opportunity to he heard by the complaining
party and, in addition, to overrule a motion attacking this appointment
without a hearing. It is interesting to note that the motion to vacate
the order of reference to the master contained allegations that he was
27. Miller v. Miller, 105 So.2d 386 (Fla. App. 1958).
28. Nystrom v. Nystrom, 105 So.2d 60 (Fla. App. 199S).
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biased; the special master overruled this motion which was affirmed by
the chancellor!
Sua sponte orders of chancellor condemned.
It was erroneous for a chancellor sua sponte to vacate a previous final
decree of divorce and to have further testimony taken before a special master
and a new "final" decree entered by a different chancellor.29
A wife filed an action entitled, "Petition in the Nature of a Bill of
Review to Have Divorce Decree Set Aside Because of Fraud." The
chancellor found that she had failed to prove her case. It was therefore
erroneous for him to sua sponte consider this as a petition to modify
a separation agreement and final decree approving such agreement under
the provisions of Section 65.15 of the Florida Statutes. This statute provides
that, "either party may apply" to the court which may modify "after
giving both parties an opportunity to be heard .. " The chancellor cannot
"upon authority of its equity and discretionary power," enter a decree upon
issues not raised in the pleadings.30
Vacating of Defaults.
\Xhen a default was entered for failure to answer at the proper time,
and the parties stipulated for a vacating of the default and an oider was
entered setting aside the default and giving the additional time in which
to file defensive pleadings, it was erroneous for the chancellor to rule
that he had no power to enlarge the time for filing pleadings when the
period had expired, and to strike the defendant's pleading and to proceed
exparte in the cause?' It is to be noted that the chancellor would not be
bound to honor the stipulation; the vacating of the default was still a
matter of discretion based upon the circumstances and exigencies of the
case. However, it was error for the chancellor to vacate the default and
then reverse himself without a showing of a subsequent default by the
defendant.
A letter by attorney may amount to a Petition for rehearing.
In Batteiger v. Batteiger3 2 the chancellor orally announced that he
was going to enter a final decree divorcing the parties and ordering a
conveyance of property. The final decree failed to "grant the divorce
specifically to" either party. The plaintiff's attorney wrote the chancellor
pointing out the error in the decree and asserting that the wife should be
awarded the home; the defendant's attorney wrote the chancellor in
29. Smith v. Smith, 98 So.2d 897 (Fla. App. 1957).
30. Mouvyois v. Mouyois, 97 So.2d 718 (Fla. App. 1957).
31. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 102 So.2d 729 (Fla. App. 195S).
32. Batteiger v. Batteiger, 109 So.2d 602 (Fla. App. 1959).
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response to this letter. The decree and two letters were filed the same
day. The lower court later entered an amended final decree. The district
court decided that these letters were "tantamount to the filing of a petition
for rehearing, inasmuch as the letters were obviously in response to an
announced final decree." Thercforc, the court did not lose jurisdiction
and could enter an amended final decree changing the property provisions
of the original "final decree."
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Appeals must be directed at final decrees.
The supreme court has concluded mia sponte that a notice of appeal
which was not directed to the final decree, but only to the order of the
chancellor denying a rehearing, did not give the appellate court jurisdiction.
"If we were to do this we would be undertaking to review a final decree
which has not been assaulted by the appellant herself."38' The Scheuermann
case34 seems to be another affirmation of this rule. The chancellor entered
a final decree of divorce which provided for attorney's fees. Four months
later, the chancellor re-opened the case for further testimony as to the
amount of the attorney's fees. A year later, the chancellor entered a
further order reestablishing the original "final" decree as to the attorney's
fees. Both parties appealed and the court held that the chancellor's
orders entered after the final decree were a nullity. Since the appeals were
directed at orders which were a nullity and no appeal was properly perfected
from the original "final" decree, the appeal (being treated as a petition
for certiorari) was denied.
Time for appeal cannot be extended by stipulation.
After a final decree has been entered (recorded in the chancery order
book) the parties may not stipulate that the decree shall be effective as of
some subsequent date for the purpose of giving an extension of time for
filing an appeal.3 5
Certiorari will not lie from post final decree orders.
The district court has ruled that certiorari does not lie to review a
chancellor's post final decree order. Section 59.02(3) of the Florida
Statutes which provided for this remedy has been superseded by Rule 4.2(a)
of the Florida Appellate Rules which provides for appeals from post final
33. KIlemenko v. Klemenko, 97 So.2d I1 (Fla. 1957). Accord Fenley v. Fenley, 103
So.2d 191 (Fla. 1958) and McNary v. Hudson, 110 So.2d 73 (Fla. App. 1959).
34. Scheucrmann v. Shamas, 97 So.2d 314 (Fla. App. 1957).
35. Salinger v. Salinger, 100 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1958).
36. Fort v. Fort, 104 So.2d 69 (Fla. App. 1958). See the prior case of Fort v. Fort,
90 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1956).
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orders and decrees.36 In accordance with this decision, the district court
had no jurisdiction of a petition for certiorari to review a post final
decree order which modified the amount of an alimony award. Under
Section 59.45 of the Florida Statutes, an appeal may be treated as a
petition for certiorari, however, the statute fails to provide for the
converse situation.3 7
Absence of appellate record precludes court front factual consideration.
The district court affirmed (without prejudice) the lower court's
decree because of the absence of an appellate record despite the contention
that there should be a modification of a child support award because
the child was now in the military service. The court considered that
since there was no record, it was not in a position to say what had
occurred before the chancellor.3 8 It is to be wondered if an appellate
record disclosing the testimony would be necessary in such a simple case?
The perennial Bredin case30 has perhaps made its final appearance40
in the appellate courts. In its closing performance the court ruled that
the original plaintiff remains the "original plaintiff" under Section 59.09
of the Florida Statutes and Rule 3.2(f) of the Florida Appellate Rules
even though relief is granted to the defendant on her counterclaim.
Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed when he failed to pay costs
which were taxed against him or failed to supersede them by the posting
of a supersedeas bond. This decision was avowedly based upon an
implication contained in the Bower's case.4"
GROUNDS AND PROOF FOR DIVORCE
Adultery, condonation and connivance therein.
The district court while stating that, "the testimony of hired detectives
should be scrutinized with great care," upheld a finding of adultery based
to a large degree upon their testimony. However, the detectives' testimony
was supported in some aspects by a wife of one of the detectives and by
the defendant wife's testifying to "circumstances which in themselves
support the finding of the chancellor. '42 However, in a later case the
same district court overruled the chancellor who had made a finding of
adultery based upon the testimony of two private investigators because
37. Pavey v. Pavey, 112 So.2d 589 (Fla, App. 1959).
38. Brady v. Brody, 105 So.2d 378 (Fla. App. 1958). The case of Murray v. Murray,
106 So.2d 859 (Ma. App. 1958) determined that when "neither the amended complaint
nor the parts of it under attack are made a part of the appeal record" the court is not in a
position to decide the sufficiency of the pleading.
39. Bredin v. Bredin, 103 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1958); 89 So.2d 353 (1956), cert. denied,
89 So.2d 357 (1956).
40. Bredin v. Bredin, 111 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1959).
41. Bower v. Bower, 55 So.2d 797 (Fla. App. 1952).
42. Parker v. Parker, 97 So.2d 136 (Fla. App. 1957).
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the facts offered were totally inadequate to support a finding of adultery.The court also decided that a prior act of adultery had been condoned
by subsequent cohabitation. 3
In the quite lengthy case of Benson v. Benson44 the district court
made the following rulings: 1. When a wife lived with another man
for approximately fourteen months it could only be interpreted that they
were living in a state of adultery; "if desire and opportunity were proven
adultery would be presumed." 2. The fact that the husband left his
wife could not be considered as connivance in her adultery when the wife
continued to live in. their home and was furnished support including an
automobile and $50 per week. And, in addition, she was not exposed to
bad company, but was left in the company of her mother who resided
in the home. 3. That connivance, if it were proved, would bar the
husband from securing a divorce based upon the wife's adultery. The
effect of this alleged connivance on the question of the adultery barring
an award of alimony, is discussed in the Alimony section of this article.
In Dworkis v. Dworkis,45 the district court disapproved of the actions
of the chancellor who made a finding that the wife had been guilty of
adultery based solely upon the husband's testimony and "the demeanor
and attitude of the wife during the trial." The district court determined
that the trial judge's observation of a party's manner and demeanor
in the court room should be limited to its bearing on the party's credibility.
Observations by the judge should not be the basis for findings on disputed
facts, because in so doing a judge may be said to have made himself a
witness, unswom and not cross-examined. "Disbelief of the denials by
one party, of facts which must be proved and corroborated, is not the
equivalent of affirmative evidence of those facts."
Pleading of "Fifth Amendment" by allegedly adulterous spouse.
The district court has ruled that when a husband seeks a divorce
upon the ground of extreme cruelty and the wife alleges the husband's
adultery as a defense, the husband may refuse to testify regarding his alleged
adultery based upon the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed
by Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution.
The court refused to decide the question of the possible effects of this
refusal upon the husband's case on the ground that it was premature at
this stage of the proceedings.4"
43. Goslinowski v. Goslinowski, 97 So.2d 723 (Fla. App. 1957).
44. eBuson v. tenson, 102 So.2d 748 (FIa. App. 1958), noted in 12 U. FLA.
L. Rrv. 107 (1959).
45. Dworkis v. Dworkis, III So.2d 70 (Fla. App. 1959).
46. Blais v. Blais, 112 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1959).
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Extreme cruelty, proof and condonation thereof.
Condonation is a question of fact, hence the district court affirmed
the chancellor who found that an alleged act of sexual intercourse which
allegedly occurred on the night before the parties separated "did not
operate to condone former acts of cruelty and misconduct without some
showing of reconciliation or penitence for past mis-conduct or hope for
better conduct in the future."4 7 The court cited a Missouri case 8 which
asserted that one act of intercourse could be considered condonation of
adultery, but not of cruelty. The distinguishing factor seems to be the
continuity of the wrongful conduct which may be a single occurrence
in adultery but a continuous thing in regard to cruelty. The instant case
should be compared with the Goslinowski case 49 which involved a charge
of adultery. It is also interesting to note that in the instant case the
plaintiff's testimony was corroborated by only one witness. In a later
case, the same district court affirmed the chancellor who had overruled the
master and denied a divorce because there was insufficient evidence of
extreme cruelty by the plaintiff and his sole witness. 0 It must be admitted
that the plaintiff's testimony of "mental cruelty" would have been
pathetically weak even if corroborated by twenty witnesses. The court
approved the actions of the chancellor in reversing the special master
because his findings and recommendations were not only clearly erroneous,
but he misconceived the legal effect of the evidence.
In a case based upon "mental cruelty" it was not necessary to prove
that the defendant's conduct was deliberate. Hence, when the facts showed
that the wife's "nagging, criticizing and kindred complaints" may have
been unwittingly pursued because of psychiatric reasons it may constitute
extreme cruelty if it caused mental pain and suffering to the plaintiff.
The court reaffirmed the subjective test of cruelty; the test is not whether
the conduct should result in pain and suffering, but whether it does have
this effect upon the other spouse.51
In accord with the subjective test of the above case, the district
court has ruled that where a husband repeatedly accused his wife of being
insane and constantly threatened to have her committed to a mental
institution and repeated his charges of insanity before the wife's friends
and relatives, this was sufficient to constitute extreme cruelty. The court
47. Mickler v. Mickler, 101 So.2d 157 (Fla. App. 1958).
48. Lowe v. Lowe, 229 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. App, 1950).
49. Note 43, supra.
50. Martin v. Martin, 102 So.2d 837 (Fla. App. 1958). The same district court in
a still later case (which again was barren of an;' pertinent facts) affirmed the findings
of the master which had been approved by the chancellor because the appellant bad failed
to show that the findings were clearly erroneous. Bouton v. Bonton, 103 So.2d 680 (Fla.
App. 1958). In accordance with the well established rule, the District Court of Appeal,
3rd District, refused to grant a divorce where the plaintiff failed to produce corroborating
testimony to substantiate her grounds. Long v. Long, 99 So.2d 641 (Fla. App. 1958).
51. Carlton v. Carlton, 104 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1958).
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placed stress on the fact that this conduct was directed at a person who
may have been suffering from a mental illness, hence she would be
more likely to suffer mental anguish and torture than a person not so
afflicted. 52 It is submitted that conduct of this type should constitute
cruelty regardless of the mental condition of the complaining spouse.
In the Berman case (which has been previously discussed) the supreme
court, without completely discussing the facts, reversed the chancellor
who had denied a divorce because the plaintiff husband had "failed to
sustain the material allegations of his complaint by a preponderance of
the evidence." With the exception of physical assaults which may have
been committed by the wife, the allegations that the wife made dis-
paraging remarks about the husband to his daughter and the attorney of
a client of the husband seemed to indicate mental cruelty which made
the marriage a "hopeless failure."
In the Dworkis case (which was partially discussed in the adultery
section), the court seemed to say that a wife's filing of criminal and
extradition proceedings against the husband for non-support when he
had been making sizable payments in support of his family and her
attempts to extradite him which were "vengeful and vindictive" would
(along with other facts) constitute extreme cruelty.
When both parties claim a divorce, the decree must be specific as to the
winning party.
The supreme court has reconciled a somewhat inconsistent line of
cases by holding that when both parties claim a divorce, it is the
responsibility of the chancellor to "specifically deternine by his final
decree the relative equities and designate the party entitled to the divorce
and the one to whom it is granted. ' 55
Naturally impotent does not mean congenitally impotent.
In a case of first impression, the district court ruled that the words
"naturally impotent"50 as grounds for divorce simply mean that the
husband was unable to copulate at the time of the marriage "and it makes
no difference whether it arose through some act of nature, through
accident, through the fault of another, or through fault of the individual
52. Talbot v. Talbot, 104 So.2d 410 (Fla. App. 1958).
53. Berman v. Bennan, 103 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1958). In Jurney v. Jumey, 110 So.2d
49 (Fla. App. 1959) the district court reversed the chancellor who had granted the
divorce because there was "no substantial evidence of extreme cruelty inflicted on the
wife by the husband . . . nor any evidence of substantial dereliction on his part in his
obligations as a husband."
54. Dworkis v. Dworkis, Ill So.2d 70 (Fla. App. 1959).
55. Friedman v. Friedman, 100 So.2d 167 (1-a. 1958). Accord Howell v. Howell,
100 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1958). For subsequent proceedings see Howell v. Howell, 109 So.2d
882 (Fla. 1959), which is discussed in tile alimony section of this article.
56. FLA. STAT. § 65.04(2) (1957).
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himself." It does not mean that this condition must have existed since
birth.5
Summary judgment may not be granted when there is a genuine
controverted issue.
In the Shulman case a Wisconsin court awarded custody of children
to the mother with the provision that they were not to be removed
from the state without a court order or with the mutual consent of the
parties. The Wisconsin court later reaffirmed that the mother could not
rcmove the children from the state. Subsequently, the mother removed
the children to Florida and instituted an action to recover delinquent
child support payments and for an increase in these payments. The court
entered a writ of ne exeat which the court later quashed and in a further
hearing entered a summary decree in favor of the husband because the
wife had come into equity with unclean hands. The wife denied the
charge contending that the husband had consented to the removal of the
children; the husband denied he had given his consent. The district court
held there was a genuine controverted issue of fact which precluded the
chancellor from entering a summary decree. 8
Legislation
Section 65.20 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
the rule that no testimony on the mcrits shall be taken for a period of thirty
days after the cause is at issue, shall be limited in application to divorce
suits. This section, before its amendment, seemed to have been possibly
applicable to other domestic relations proceedings, for example actions for
separate maintenance.-9
Section 65.04 of the Florida Statutes was amended to include "habitual
use of narcotics by defendant" in addition to "habitual intemperance" as a
ground for divorce."'
ALIMONY
The amount, duration and modification of alimony awards.
The district court affirmed an award of $100 per week as alimony
and support for three minor children plus home mortgage payments, taxes
and insurance. The husband, for six years preceding the divorce decree,
earned an average of approximately $20,000 per year. However, his earnings
in 1956 had decreased to $8,600 because of a disability resulting from an
57. Cott v. Cott, 98 So.2d 379 (Fla. App. 1957).
58. Shulman v. Miller, 107 So.2d 274 (Fla. App. 1959).
59. FLA. STAT. § 65.20 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-64, S.B.No. 114, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
60. FLA. STAT. § 65.04 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-223, S.B.No. 529, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
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injury. The court suggested that if the payments subsequently proved to
be a burden or hardship on the husband, he could petition for a reduction.61
In an overly terse opinion, the supreme court affirmed a support order
without prejudice to the husband's asking for modification based upon his
physical disabilities resulting from an automobile accident and any other
factors affecting the husband's earning ability or the wife's need for
support. 2
The awarding of temporary alimony and counsel fees is within the
sound discretion of the chancellor, and the burden of clearly showing an
abuse of discretion rests upon the complaining party. 63
In the Sliner ease,"4 the husband was a "man of considerable wealth"
who enjoyed a large income. The chancellor granted a divorce to the
husband, gave custody of two minor children to the wife and awarded
her the sum of seventy dollars per week for each child. However, he denied
her any alimony except the sum of two lmindred dollars per month for
a period of eighteen months in order "to help the wife rehabilitate herself
from an carning standpoint." The district court reversed, holding that by
the terms of this decree, the wife would soon be forced to leave the
hoic in order to secure employment thereby depriving the children of
a family environment. The chancellor was ordered to reconsider the
amount of child support, as well as alimony, in order to allow the wife
and children to conform with the mode of living that the husband had
established for himself.
The Mack case, involving a dispute over the amount of alimony and
attorney's fees, presented a somewhat involved factual pattern. The
husband was a blind, arthritic, fifty year old veteran. He had assets worth
in excess of $70,000 and a possible income (from these assets and a
disability pension) of $290.24 per month. The wife was 46 years of age
with a "take-home pay of $206 per month." She had a child by a former
marriage and was entitled to receive $50 per month from the government
for support of this child who was the son of a veteran killed overseas. These
support payments were to terminate within 17 months. She and her son
had a joint bank account in the amount of $300; she was the owner
of realty worth $6,250 and her living expenses totaled $276 per month.
The district court affirmed the chancellor in his awarding the wife alimony
in the amount of $75 per month and attorney's fees of $800. If the
husband's testimony (that his living expenses amounted to $345 per
month) is believed, it would appear that he will have to withdraw
$129.76 per month from his assets in order to exist.65
61. Lewis v. Lewis, 104 So.2d 597 (Fla. App. 1958).
62. Fort v. Fort, 97 So,2d 690 (Fla. 1957).
63. Gilbert v, Gilbert, 105 So.2d 379 (Fla. App, 1958).
64. Slimer v. Slimer, 112 So,2d 581 (Fla. App, 1959).
65. Mack v. Mack, 112 So.2d 861 (Fla. App. 1959).
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The wife may have no need for alimony when the husband gives her all his
property, or the parties were mnarried for a short period.
In the Griffin case"6 the district court decided that when the husband
gave his wife property worth $80,000 (his lifetime savings) and that
she was an anesthetist capable of earning a substantial income, the
chancellor was not in error in denying her alimony.
In determining the amount of alimony it was apparently appropriate
for the chancellor to consider that the wife was guilty of extreme cruelty;
that the parties had lived together for only two years and eight months;
and that the husband had made gifts to the wife during their short
sojourn together. 7
A noney judgment may be entered in equity for delinquent
alimony payments.
The district court decided that it was proper for a chancellor to award
a money judgment for delinquent alimony payments rather than enforcing
the original order. 1-lowever, it was improper to reduce the amount of
future alimony (as requested in the husband's amended answer) without
giving the wife an opportunity to be heard. 8
Lump-sum awards.
In accord with the Reid case69 the district court determined that
a chancellor may award the husband's interest in a tenancy by the entirety
(which becomes a tenancy in common at the instant of divorce) to the
wife as a lump sum alimony award. Hence, the court upheld the award
of the equity worth approximately $2,000 as equivalent to "permanent"
alimony of $25 per week for a period of less than two years. The
portion of the decree which awarded the wife a half interest in their
doughnut shop was not attacked by the husband.70
The district court, in another case which was barren of facts, affirmed
a lump sum alimony award of $1,500. The court devoted most of its opinion
to the error of the appellant in not having an appendix to his brief.7 '
When the facts disclosed that the husband was possessed of a trust
estate valued in excess of $200,000 from which he received an annual
income of approximately $15,000 after taxes, it was not error to award the
wife lump sum alimony of $15,000; $100 per week for the support of
two children; $65 per week to the wife for three years, and attorney's
66. Griffin v. Griffin, 107 So,2d 236 (Flu. App. 1958).
67. Howell v. Howell, 107 So.2d 882 (Pla. 1959).
68, Parrish v. Parrish, 99 So.2d 715 (Fla. App. 1958).
69. Reid v. Reid, 68 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1953).
70. Killian v. Killiaii, 97 So.2d 201 (Fl, App. 1957).
71. Farina v. Farin, 97 So.2d 485 (Fla. App. 1957).
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fees of $1,750. It is interesting to note that the court decided that the
fact the wife accepted and used alimony of $2,500 which was awarded
tinder the first hearing, did not bar her from secking and recovering the
larger amount of $15,000 on a petition for rehearing. The court drew a
distinction between a petition foi rehearing and an appeal in that a timely
petition for a rehearing is a continuation of the original suit and not
an appeal. 72 This case should be compared with the Brooks case7" which
is discussed in the following section.
Acceptance of permanent alimony acts as a waiver to an appeal
based upon the amount of alimony.
In the Brooks case 74 it was determined that a wife who accepted
permanent alimony payments under a divorce decree waived her right
to appeal as to such award. Hence, when a wife was awarded $6,000
(payable at the rate of $500 per month) and she accepted the full amount
before the case was heard in the supreme court, she waived her objections
to that portion of the decree. The court noted that this ruling would
not leave the wife destifute; she could always ask the court for temporary
alimony and attorney's fees pending the appeal.
The plaintiff in Morton v. Morton 6 was apparently cognizant of
the rule of the Brooks case and although being awarded $950 per
month as penanent alimony, moved the district court to enter an award
of temporary alimony while the case was on appeal. The court was unable
to determine what could be a reasonable amount from the record and
ordered the amount of the permanent alimony as temporary alimony.
In another case of first impression, 0 the supreme court (after
reviewing conflicting dicta in prior cases) determined that the chancellor
has the power to modify an award of alimony effective as of the date
of the petition rather than the more usual date of the entry of the order.
The court further decided that it did not matter that the wife had
accepted alimony payments between the time of filing the petition and the
entry of the order of modification. Again the distinction seems to be that
the acceptance of alimony while the trial court has jurisdiction cannot
be considered in the same category as an acceptance of permanent alimony
while the case is on appeal.
Declaratory decree to interpret meaning of alimony clause of final decree.
In a case of apparent first impression the supreme court was called
upon in a declaratory decree action to approve or disapprove the inter-
72. Cocalis v. Cocalis, 103 So.2d 230 (ia, App. 1958).
73. Brooks v. Brooks, 100 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1958).
74. Su ra.
75. Morton v. Morton, 104 So,2d 472 (Fla. App. 1958).
76. McArthur v. McArthur, 106 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1958).
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pretation made by the chancellor of a provision in a divorce decree which
awarded the sum of $50 per week "as alimony and maintenance" for
two minor children, "until Saul Zalka, the son of the parties hereto,
shall have reached the age of Twenty-one (21) years, or until the death
or remarriage of the plaintiff, Rose Levin Zalka." The chancellor construed
this clause as providing for alimony of $50 per week which did not
terminate upon the son's reaching his majority. The court stated that
this clause was for the benefit of both the wife and children and there
was no indication in the parties oral agreement (which was the predicate
for this clause) that the payments should stop when the son became
twenty-one years old. However, the court determined that this clause
provided for both alimony and child support payments and that the wife
was entitled to receive alimony after her son reached his majority, but she
was not entitled to the original sum. The case was remanded to the lower
court to make the proper allocations between the wife and children.
Finally, the court after finding a "decided conflict" on this question, adopted
the rule that the modification should be effective as of the date of the
son's majority.7
The incorporation of the husband's profession can not be utilized
to circumvent an alimony award.
The case of Hood v. Hood"8 illustrates the unsuccessful attempts of
a husband to reduce his alimony payments by incorporating his profession.
The husband, a successful doctor, entered into a settlement agreement
(which was approved by the court subsequent to a divorce decree), whereby
he agreed to pay his wife a percentage of his adjusted gross income "derived
solely from his medical practice." Subsequently, the husband incorporated
his medical practice. The husband and wife each held 49 per cent of the
stock of the corporation. Under the new arrangement, the husband's income
suffered a serious dimunition. The court stated that even if the husband
were free from moral wrong (as found by the lower court), "such an
arrangement cannot be used to impair the right of the appellant to her
income as reasonably expected through the formula agreed upon and
sanctioned by the court." The court did not attempt to invalidate the
corporation, but held only that the arrangement could not be used to
circumvent the court sanctioned alimony agreement.
Contempt orders must relate the amount of arrearages and how the
contemptee is to purge the contempt.
It was erroneous for a court to enter a contempt order for failure to
pay alimony without including a finding as to the amount of arrearages
77. Zalka v. Zalka, 100 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1958). On similar facts the court in
Katiba v. Katiba, 110 So.2d 693 (Fla. App. 1959) cited the Zalka case as controlling.
78. flood v. Hood, 100 So.2d 422 (Fla. App. 1958).
79. Lord v. Lord, 104 So.2d 624 (Fla. App. 1958).
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and a provision that the husband may purge himself and be released by
paying the arrearages.
Even though adultery may be comniitted through connivance of the husband,
it will still bar wife from alimony.
In the Benson case" (which has been previously discussed) the cout
held that although the connivance of the husband in the adultery of his
wife would bar him from securing a divorce for adultery, her adultery
would bar her from receiving any alimony "because of the statutory inter-
diction." In addition, the court ruled that in the absence of a proper lump
sum award of alimony, or proof that the wife contributed to the acquisition
of real property held as tenants by the entirety, the chancellor had no
power to award the husband's interest (which would be as a tenant in
common at the instant of divorce) to the wife.
The killing of the ex-husband by the ex-wife deprives her of alimony,
even though entitled "lump sum alimony."
A wife secured two judgments in New York against her husband.
Subsequently she secured a divorce from him in Florida. The divorce decree
gave the New York indgments effect as Florida decrees and judgments
and in addition awarded her "as hunp sum alimony the sum of five
thousand dollars, to be paid at the rate of fifteen dollars per week."
Shortly after the decree, she killed her divorced husband and was convicted
of manslaughter. The district court ruled that the maxim "that no person
should be permitted to profit from his own wrong," would not bar recovery
on the two judgments or decrees because they were prc-cxisting debts and
the equitable enforcement was an additional remedy which the woman
deprived herself of; actually she suffered a detriment rather than a benefit.
However, this equitable maxim would be utilized to deprive her of the
right to recover the alimony. Although the alimony was labeled "lump
sum alimony it was actually alimony payable in weekly installments." It
was not a present debt, but a periodic obligation which could not be
accelerated by the woman's own wrong. 1
Laches nay be asserted as a defense to the collection of delinquent alinmony
and support payments.
An ex-husband defaulted in the making of alimony and support pay-
ments in 1946. The cx-wife made no demand for payment until 1957, soon
after the ex-husband had sold his interest in a business to his sons. The
district court upheld the defense of laches because the ex-husband had,
80. Benson v. Benson, 102 So.2d 748 (Fla. App. 1958), noted in 12 U. PLA. L.
REv. 107 (1959).
81. Morgenstern v. Ruza, 101 So.2d 429 (Ha. App. 1958).
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in reliance upon her acquiescence, changed his position to his injury in
that: 1. He hired his sons and later sold the business to them; 2. he married
again and had children as a result of this marriage; 3. he would not
have disposed of his business had he not had an understanding that the
cx-wife would refrain from demanding payments, and 4. he had no income
except the monthly payments from the sale of the business. 82
Accrued alimony may not be judicially mizodified nor may future alimony be
modified unless delinquent alimony is paid or good cause is shown
for non-payment.
In 'Watson v. McDowel,a the ex-wife brought suit in Florida for
arrearages of alimony and child support awarded by a Kentucky decree.
A portion of the arrearages was based upon a judgment of the Kentucky
court, while the remainder consisted of amounts due under the divorce
decree as modified by two subsequent decrees. On a question of pleading,
the Florida court decided that: 1. Kentucky, like Florida, holds that
installments of alimony and maintenance become vested when they become
due and the court has no power to modify the accrued payments;
2. when existing arrearages are still outstanding, no counter-claim for mnodi-
fication of the final decree as to the future payments under changed
financial circumstances will be permitted unless the arrearages are paid, or
the ex-husband demonstrates his inability to pay them.
The Fischbach case84 seems difficult to reconcile with the preceding
case. A wife brought suit in Florida to enforce past due and currently
maturing alimony which had been awarded to her pursuant to a separate
maintenance decree (and seemingly a subsequent judgment) entered in
New York. The chancellor decreed that the New York decree be established
as a Florida decree, authorized execution for the amount of the New
York judgment, ordered compliance with the New York decree as to
future payments and then reserved to the husband the right to apply
for modification of future payments. The district court affirmed by stating
that, "The Chancellor properly refused to order the defendant to pay
the amounts which had accrued under the New York decree between
the time of the judgment there for arrears and the hearing in the local
court; . . ." The author has no quarrel with that part of the decision
which enforced the New York judgment. However, why should the Florida
courts "properly refuse" to enforce an existing, unmodified order of the
New York courts? Under the usual conflict of laws rule, if accrued alimony
is not subject to modification in New York, then it cannot be modified
in Florida. Inasmuch as both Florida and New York provide that accrued
82. Brown v. Brown, 108 So.2d 492 (fla. App. 1959).
83. Watson v. McDowell, 110 So.2d 680 (Fla. App. 1959).
84. Fisehbach v. Fisehbach, 112 So.2d 880 (Fla. App. 1959).
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alimony may not be modified, what is the possible reason for denying
enforcement of it?
A wife may be forever foreclosed from receiving alimony because a court
confused a substantive right with a procedural device.
The majority ruling in the Kirby case85 seems to have been a poorly
conceived one. The Chancellor entered a divorce decree in favor of the
wife awarding her custody of the" children and support money for them.
However, the chancellor denied her any alimony because she had no
economic need for it. The wife appealed contending that the main error
of the chancellor was in his failing to retain jurisdiction over the cause
to award her alimony if there ever was a subsequent change in the
financial circumstances of the parties. She contended that since the
chancellor failed to retain jurisdiction, she would be forever foreclosed
from receiving any even if she became ill and could not work and the
husband inherited a substantial sum of money. The district court (on
the original hearing) seemed to agree with the wife's contentions that
she would be forever foreclosed from receiving any alimony. However,
they did not believe that the chancellor's actions were an abuse of
discretion. Upon re-hearing, Justice Sturgis dissented by succintly stating
that there is a distinction between the fundamental right to alimony and
the collateral questions "as to the amount, kind and character thereof,
and . .. whether, when, and by what method the party entitled shall
enjoy the fruits of the right." The fallacy of the majority position was
beautifully stated by Justice Sturgis:
Surely it would be a travesty on logic and justice to hold that the
Chancellor, by the device of finding that there exists no equity
requiring the immediate payment of alimony and coupling that
finding with a decree that does not affirmatively retain jurisdic-
tion for the purpose of awarding alimony at a later date as the
equities might require, can obliterate entirely the right to alimony
where it is unequivocally established by the proofs. (Emphasis
by the court.)
PROPERTY RIGHTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
Former resident not entitled to plead that insurance is exempt from creditors.
The supreme court has ruled 8 that when a former wife institutes
proceedings to secure collection of arrearages in alimony and child support
payments, the Florida court may sequester insurance policies issued on
the life of the non-resident husband in order to satisfy the money decree.
Section 222.14 of the Florida Statutes which exempts "cash surrender
values of life insurance policies issued upon the lives of citizens or residents
of the State of Florida. . . ," does not exempt the former husband when
85. Kirby v. Kirby, IIl So.2d 299 (Fla. App. 1959).
86. Marshall v. Bacon, 97 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1957).
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he is a resident of a foreign state at the time he asserts the exemption.
In accordance with the Slatcoff87 decision, the question is the domiciliary
status of the insured at the time when creditors attempt to subject the
cash value of the insurance to their claims, not at the time when the
policies were purchased.
Tenancies by the entirety.
The supreme court approved (in part) a decree of the chancellor
which gave the divorced wife the right to live in a house for the remainder
of her life in lieu of any alimony. Prior to the divorce the parties held
the property as a tenancy by the entirety (which, of course, became a
tenancy in common upon divorce) and the court dismissed the husband's
contention that the wife's life expectancy was greater than his. The court
modified the decree by stating that the wife should have possession and
the profits (from rentals) for the remainder of her life or until she
remarried because the award was in lieu of alimony. 8
Inasmuch as an adulterous wife is not entitled to alimony, she is not
entitled to the complete title to property formerly held as a tenancy by
the entirety "in lieu of alimony and all other claims," absent a showing
that the wife has an equity in the property arising from the contribution
of funds or services in its acquisition or improvement which are above
and beyond the usual marital duties.89
When a husband "scrambled" his own property by conveying it to
various corporation which were allegedly his alter ego, the chancellor
was not obligated to "unscramble" the transactions which occurred prior
to the filing of the divorce complaint because they did not constitute
a fraud upon the wife. In addition, where the wife and husband contracted
jointly to purchase their home, but the title was placed in the husband's
name alone, the chancellor had the right to determine that the husband
took the "legal title as a trustee for the benefit of his wife and himself."
Therefore, the property was held as a tenancy by the entirety which became
a tenancy in common by virtue of the divorce decree.90
In the Wood case"' the wife proved that she contributed substantially
all of the purchase price of the property held as tenants by the entirety;
that she made the monthly payments from her funds and used a $2,000
inheritance which either went into the real property or into an automobile
87. Slatcoff v. Dexen, 76 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1954).
88. Banks v. Banks, 98 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1957).
89. Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1958).
90. Picchi v. Picchi, 100 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1958).
91. Wood v. Wood, 104 So.2d 879 (Fla. App. 1958). The reader is referred
to the case of Demetriou v. Demetrion, 108 So.2d 786 (Fla. App. 1959) for a further
illustration of property and alimony allocation. The author believes the case is not
worthwhile discussing in the text.
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which was awarded to the husband. Hence, the court affirmed an award of
the sole ownership of the real property to her.
The district court has ruled that the law of New York is comparable
to that of Florida in that upon divorce, tenants by the entirety in real
property become tenants in common."' It was therefore erroneous for a
Florida chancellor to order that New York real estate (held as an estate
by the entirety) be sold and the proceeds equally divided absent an
award of alimony or support obligation attached to the property or
absent a showing of special equities in the property.
When a husband and Wife contributed moneys to a bank account
held in their joint names, "as joint tenants with the right of survivorship
and not as tenants in common," and the husband withdrew the money
(without the consent of the wife) and made a gift of it to his brother,
the wife could assert her claim to the entire amount upon the death of
the husband. Similarly, when the couple contributed to the purchase
price of real property, held as an estate by the entirety, and the wife and
husband conveyed to a corporation which gave stock to the husband as
consideration for the conveyance, and the husband made a gift (without
the knowledge of the wife) of the stock to his brother, the surviving
wife could assert her claim to all the stock upon the death of the husband.
On the other hand, when the husband changed the beneficiary of his life
insurance policy from his wife to his brother, and this change was made
without any fraud, duress, or undue influence, the wife had no claim to
the proceeds.0 3
The claims of the wife in the husband's business.
When a wife in her divorce complaint and at the hearing claimed
an alleged partnership interest in a business, it was erroneous for the
chancellor to fail to adjudicate the respective intcrests. The court mentioned
that "An award of alimony will not suffice as a substitute for a wife's
special equity in her husband's property, nor will her failure to qualify
for alimony bar her from recovering any special interest to which she
may be entitled. 014
When the wife's testimony about working in her husband's store
was vague as to over what period of time it took place and that when
she served as her husband's bookkeeper she was paid $50 per month until
he employed someone else at one half that amount, she failed to show
sufficient proof that she contributed financially to the husband's business
or acquisition of property or that she rendered personal services to the
business which would entitle her to any equity in it. 5
92. Bell v. Bell, 112 So.2d 63 (Fla. App. 1959).
93. Lerner v. Lerner, 113 So.2d 212 (Fa. App. 1959).
94. Shannon v. Shannon, 101 So.2d 428 (Fla. App. 1958).
95. Roberts v. Roberts, 101 So.2d 884 (Fla. App. 1958).
[VOL. XIV
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
In Lacker v. Zuern " two married couples each owned, as tenants by
the entirety, an undivided one-half interest in a partnership business.
The plaintiff wifc alleged that she had been ejected from the partnership
by her husband and the other couple and that they were "draining off
the profits in salaries." She asked for a dissolution of the partnership
and for other relief. The district court stated that the right to dissolve
the partnership was not in irreconcilable conflict with the rule which
forbids the unilateral destruction of an estate by the entirety. The court,
after quoting from the Dodson case 7 that, "The income from, or the
proceeds of, the sale of real estate held by the entireties is equally the
property of the husband and wife. . . . Either one taking possession holds
for the benefit of both," said that this case (and others cited in the
opinion), by necessary implication, was authority for granting equitable
relief against the husband when he is draining off the profits. This case
merely decided that the complaint stated a cause of action, hence, the
court did not specify what relief could or would be given to the wife.
The wife's living in adultery will not bar her right of dower.
The district court has seemingly held that the Statute of Westminster II
(which barred a wife from her dower interest if she left her husband and
lived in adultery with another man) is not in force in Florida because
this statute was enacted when there was no absolute divorce in England
while today adultery is a ground for divorce in Florida. Therefore, the
statute is inconsistent with the present laws of marriage and divorce. It
is submitted that this rejection of the Statute is pure dicta. The reported
case did not state that the wife had lived in adultery with another man.
It stated that her husband had lived in adultery with another woman,
hence the Statute, by its own terms, was not germane to the case. Finally,
the court ruled that the wife was not estopped to assert her dower interest
due to the fact that her husband lived with another woman and repre-
sented this woman to be his wife when he executed mortgages on his
property. 98
The preceding case should be compared with the case of Kreisel v.
Ingham.0 In Kreisel, a wife secured a separate maintenance decree against
the husband in 1942. The husband became in arrears, disappeared from
his home city and was not seen or heard from until his wife died, some
fourteen years later. The district court ruled that the mere delinquency
of the husband in making the support payments would not estop him,
96. Lackcr v. Z7ucrn, 109 So,2d 181 (Fla. App. 1959).
97. Dodson v. National Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 So.2d 402, 404 (1947).
98- Wax v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1958). discusscd in Cotninent,
Misconduct in the Marital Relation: Adultery As A Bar to Dower, 13 U. miA ! L. RE.w
83 (1958).
99. Kreisel v. Ingham, 113 So.2d 205 (Fla. App. 1959).
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as sole heir of his wife, from inheriting her estate. Doherty v. Traxler'00
(which applied an estoppel against the husband) was distinguished because
there the husband had never consummated the marriage, had married the
wife for the sole purpose of acquiring all interest in her property, and
bad consummated a bigamous "marriage" with another for over twenty
years. The author must agree that Kreisel is clearly distinguishable from
Doherty. However, the court should be criticized for an incomplete task
of research. The court made an exhaustive research of how other states
have treated this problem and the related problem presented when the
wife leaves the husband, lives with another man and then the Statute
of Westminster is asserted against her claim of dower, but for some strange
reason, the court overlooked the Wax v. Wilson decision' 0 ' of the district
court, third district, on the Statute of Westminster. It would appear
that the right hand should know what the left hand is doingi
A conveyance of property made shortly before and in contemplation of
marriage may result in a tnist being created in the mala fide granteee.
The Davis case""2 had the following involved fact pattern. A couple
were divorced and the husband was ordered to pay alimony. Thereafter,
the ex-husband acquired a lot through an exchange with his mother. Nine
months prior to his re-marriage to his ex-wife, the ex-husband conveyed
the lot back to his mother. After his re-marriage his mother granted the
lot to him for his life or until his marriage should terminate. The wife
invested some of her funds in the construction of a house on this lot.
This second marriage was ended by a divorce and the wife sought to hold
the mother as trustee of the property for her son. The supreme court
found there was insufficient proof that the husband intended to place
his property beyond the reach of his prospective wife because there was no
evidence at the time that he conveyed to his mother that he intended to
remarry, or propose remarriage to his former wife. The court reviewed
numerous cases (from other jurisdictions) which raised a trust because
of the proof of an agreement to marry and facts showing that the
conveyances were made very shortly before the marriage. Howveer, the
court did state that the wife, upon remand of the case, could seek to
have an equitable lien impressed upon the property for the money which
she contributed.
The rationale of the Davis case, supra, obviously seemed to control
the decision in the King case,'0 3 although the district court failed to cite
it as authority. In King the district court upheld the chancellor who found
that at the time a man conveyed property to his mother, he was engaged
100. Doheity v. "'raxler, 66 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1953).
101. Note 98, supra.
102. Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (F1a. 1957).
103. King v. King, 107 So.2d 259 (Fla, App, 1958),
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to marry; that when he did marry, he and his wife treated the property as
though they were tenants by the entirety; that their joint funds and
efforts went into improving the property and in the payment of the
mortgage indebtedness. Therefore, the wife was entitled to one-half interest
in this property upon the entry of the divorce decree. However, the
Florida Supreme Court reversed 104 because it conflicted with the holding
of the Davis case. In Davis, the Supreme Court specified that the proof
must partake of a clear and convincing character in order for the court
to raise a trust. In King, the district court was content to rely upon the
view that, "There is evidence to support the chancellor's findings" and he
will not be reversed on a question of fact unless his findings are clearly
erroneous. Therefore, the King case failed to utilize the proper evidentiary
rule.
A declaratory decree may be utilized to determine the liability of each spouse
for capital gains taxes.
In Bartholf v. Bartholf1 5 a couple were living apart pursuant to a
decree of separate maintenance. They agreed that each owned an undivided
one-half interest in dairy property although the record title was in the
name of the husband alone. The property was sold and the Federal
government assessed all the capital gains income tax against the husband
who brought suit to have the Florida court determine that he was liable
for only one-half (pursuant to the agreement of the parties) of the tax.
The court determined that he was entitled to a decree under the statute.10 6
The strong dissent stated that since the husband alleged a complete and
unambiguous agreement, there was nothing to construe; that the decree
would be useless because it would not bind the Federal Government
which was not a party to the proceedings; and this agreement being oral,
rather than written, it did not fall within the Florida statute. 0 T The
writer is forced to agree with the dissent that the majority opinion was
plainly erroneous.
County judge's court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity
of antenuptial agreements.
Although jurisdiction to assign dower rests exclusively in the county
judges' court, the jurisdiction to test the validity of an antenuptial agreement
104. King v, King, Ill So.2d 33 (Fla. 1959). See also Moskovits v. Moskovits, 112
So.2d 875 (Fla. App. J959) which seemingly held that where a wife alleged she was
forced to leave her husband hecause of his misconduct; he then executed a will
leaving all his property to others and the wife reconciled with him upon the strength
of his promising to revoke the will, she had stated a cause of action for the equitable
revocation of the will.
105. Bartholf v. Bartholf, 108 So.2d 905 (1l1a. App. 1959).
106. FIA. STAT. § 87,01 (1957).
107. FLA. SrAT. § 87.02 (1957).
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(which denied the wife any share in the husband's estate) is in the
circuit court.108
Requirements for affidavit for publication enabling court to award husband's
real property to the wife.
In Torchiana v. Torchiaua'0" the wife secured a divorce decree which
awarded her, in lieu of a lump sum alimony award, certain Florida lands
owned by the husband who was apparently living out of the state. The
affidavit for publication stated, "von are hereby notified that a complaint for
divorce has been filed against you ....... Thc affidavit failed to comply
with Section 48.08 of the Florida Statutes which requires that the notice
shall state "the description of the real property, if any, proceeded against."
Therefore, the district court ruled that the chancellor had no jurisdiction to
award the husband's interest in his property to his wife.
Legislation.
Section 222.13 of the Florida Statutes was amended 1  to provide that
life insurance proceeds which are payable to the insured's estate can be
bequeathed by the insured's last will and testament free from all claims
by creditors. If the insured leaves no will (or fails to bequeath the insurance
proceeds in a will) the administrator is to pay the proceeds to the surviving
spouse and children if the insurance policy is payable to the estate. Whether
the proceeds will be exempt from creditors in this latter situation, seems
to be left in some doubt by the wording of the amendment.
The Free Dealer Law of 1943"' was amended" 2 by providing that
the service of publication on the husband must be based upon a sworn
statement showing that diligent search and inquiry had been made in
order to discover his residence.
PROPERTY, TORTS AND INSURANCE
Cases concerning property, torts, wills and insurance which incidentally
involve a family relationship are discussed elsewhere in this issue.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Amount of wife's attorney's fees awarded by appellate courts.
The courts are usually awarding the stum of $200 to the wife's attorney
for undertaking the appeal;' ' even when the husband is in a financially
108. In re Estate of Gze, 109 So2d 170 (Vla. App. 1959).
109. Torchiana v. Torchiana, 111 So.2d 103 (Fla. App. 1959).
110. FLA. STAT. § 222,13 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-333, H.B. No. 1330, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
111. FLA. STAT. § 62.42 (1943).
112. FLA. STAT. § 62.421 (1959), created by ch. 59-44, S.B. No. 116, 37th General
Session, Florida (1959).
113. Smith v. Smith. 100 So.2d 391 (Via. 1958); Nelson v. Nelson, 101 So.2d 582
(Fla. App. 1958); Stigelbaur v, Stigelbaur. 105 So.2d 584 (Fla. App. 1958); Nystrom
v. Nystrom, 105 So,2d 605 (la. App. 1958).
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enviable position, the fee seldom exceeds $350,114 It is to be wondered
if the somewhat common violation of court rules relative to the forms
of the briefs, appendices and record could be possibly attributed (at least
in part) to this penurious attitude (particularly in this inflationary period)
of the courts?
Innocent wife entitled to attorney's fees in divorce even when "husband"
has another wife.
In the first case squarely on point, the supreme court decided that
"in a divorce action by an innocent wife when she is met by a counter-claim
of her punative husband announcing the invalidity of the 'marriage' because
of the existence of a prior living spouse (of the husband), the wife is entitled
to recover reasonable attorney's fees for the services of her attorney to
the date of the final decree."' 15 Inasmuch as the court twice repeated the
word "innocent," it is to be wondered if the court will recede from the
ruling in the Therry casell" (which was cited by the court) which allowed
the wife who had a living spouse to recover attorney's fees in the lower
court as well as in the supreme court. In the instant case no mention was
made of attorney's fees to be awarded for the appeal.
"Damages for delay" clause of a supersedeas bond does not include
attorney's fees for wife's attorney.
In Smith v. Smith" T the supreme court ordered the husband to pay
his wife's attorneys $200 as their fee. A rule to show cause was issued
by the court upon the husband's failure to pay and the surety on the
supcrsedeas bond disclosed that it held a $1,000 cash deposit from the
husband as security for the bond. The husband showed that, because of his
economic circumstances, be was paying the attorneys ten dollars per month.
The court held that under a bond which recited a provision to pay "costs,
interest if chargeable, and damages for delay," attorneys' fees paid by an
appellee in resisting'an unsuccessful appcal were not recoverable as damages.
In addition, since the husband was making installment payments, he was
not in willful contempt of court. Finally, the court ordered the surety
company to pay $200 to the wife's attorneys from the sum that it held
as security.
114. Parker v. Parker, 97 So.2d 136 (Fla. App. 1957) ($250); Hood v. Ilood, 100So.2d 422 (Hla. App. 1958) ($300); DIemetriou v. Demetriou, 108 So2d 786 (Fla. App.
1959) ($300); McKenzie v. McKenzie, 105 So.2d 614 (Pla. App. 1958) ($350); Roberts
v. Roberts, 101 So.2d 884 (Fla. App. 1958) ($500); Griffin v. Griffin, 107 So.2d 236(Fla. App. 1958) ($500); Morton v. Morton, 108 So.2d 779 (Fla. App. 1959) ($500).
115. Young v. Yonng, 97 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1957).
116. Therry v. Therm', 117 Fla. 453, 158 So. 120 (1934).
117. Smith v. Smith, 100 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1958).
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Mother of illegitimate child who successfully defends her custody
is not entitled to attorney's fees.
In another case of apparent first impression"18 the district court held
that the mother of an illegitimate child who successfully resisted the
efforts of the father to modify a former custody order and thereby gain
custody of the child was not entitled to attorney's fees. The court stated that
the only statute remotely in point was Section 65.16.110 However, this
statute provides only for attorney's fees to "the divorced wife" and the
statute could not be stretched "under the guise of interpreting this
legislative act."
Attorney's fees are payable to the wife for "enforcing' an alimony award,
but not for attacking or modifying it.
A former wife who institutes proceedings to have a divorce decree set
aside for fraud is not entitled to attorney's fees and travel expenses incurred
in the prosecution of the action. Section 65.16 of the Florida Statutes
which gives the chancellor discretion to award attorney's fees is limited to
the "enforcement" of decrees of alimony and support; it does not apply
when the wife is attempting to have the decree set aside.120
However, in the later case of Cullette v. Ochoa121 the wife filed suit
under Section 65.18 of the Florida Statutes for an increase in child support
payments and for attornicy's fees and expenses; the evidence showed that
the husband was not in arrears in payments but had voluntarily increased
his payments. The court ruled that Section 65.18 was limited to the
enforcement, not the modification of support orders, and that the lower
court could have considered the suit as being brought under Section 65.15.
However, this section makes no provision for the awarding of attorney's
fees, hence none could be awarded.
In the Hood case 122 (which has been previously discussed) the court
stated that since the wife brought an action to enforce the court sanctioned
agreement as against the husband's incorporating his professional activities,
she was entitled to an award of attorney's fees because "she is litigating
in effect to enforce her alimony rights. .. ."
The Blunda case"' is another facet of this "enforcement" concept.
When the wife resisted the efforts of the husband to modify an award
(which was based on a property settlement) she was in effect enforcing
118. Dillman v. Dilinan, 105 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1958).
119. FLA, STAT. § 65.16 (1957).
120. Mouyois v. Mottyois, 97 So.2d 718 (Fla. App. 1957).
121. Cullette v. Ochua, 104 So.2d 799 (Fla. App. 1958).
122. Hood v. Ilood, 100 So,2d 422 (Fla. App. 1958).
123. Blunda v. Blnda, 101 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1958).
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the award and entitled to attorney's fees of $150 under the ruling of the
Simpson case.124
This "enforcement" concept was again illustrated in the Miller case 125
where the awarding of counsel fees in the lower court for securing a money
judgment based upon a New York judgment for delinquent alimony and
support was approved under Section 65.16 of the Florida Statutes.
In the McArthur case 120 (which has been previously discussed) which
was making its second appearance in the supreme court, the wife asserted
that her actions in the trial court after the ease had been sent back were
required in the carrying out of the supreme court's mandate and "therefore
were in the nature of enforcement of an order providing for alimony so
as to come within the confines of Sec. 65.16, F.S.A." Despite this ingenious
argument, the court stated that the issuance of the mandate in the
supreme court hearing did not change the character of the proceedings;
it still remained "an affirmative effort on the part of the wife to increase
her alimony." It is to be noted that in the Hood case 27 the wife was
entitled to her attorney's fees because she was enforcing her alimony
rights, while in the McArthur case the wife was not enforcing an existing
order but was asking for an increase.
No reversal of an alimony award unless abuse of discretion is proved.
The district court reiterated the well established rule that when the
statutory basis for an award of alimony, counsel fees and suit money
pendente lite has been established, the appellate court will not reverse
"unless a clear abuse of discretion is made to appear." 128
If husband and wife's ability to pay are about equal,
no attorney's fees will be awarded.
A lower court award of $750 as attorneys fees was reversed when the
cvidcnce disclosed that the husband earned only $53 per week; that the
wife "cleared" $44 per week in her employment and received $15 per
week child support from the husband. The court stated that, "the wife's
ability to pay her attorney almost parallels that of the husband," and
remanded the case to the chancellor for reconsideration. 29
124. Simpson v. Simpson, 63 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1953).
125. Miller v. Miller, 105 So.2d 386 (Fla. App. 1958).
126, McArtbhr v. McArthur, 106 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1958), note 76, supra.
127. Note 122, supra.
128. Vecsey v. Vecsey, 100 So.2d 437 (Fla. App. 1958).
129. Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Attorney's fees may constitute a lien against wife's assets which she obtained
after reconciliation as the result of a separate maintenance action.
In the Robertson case' 30 the wife employed an attorney to prosecute
her separate maintenance action. Originally, the attorney was to look to
the husband for his fees. However, the parties reconciled, with the wife
obtaining all of the family assets. The district court held; 1. that after
reconciliation of the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction to award
attorney's fees to be secured by a lien upon the property obtained by
the wife from the husband as a result of the attorney's efforts; 2. the
first fee agrcement had been abandoned and a new implied fee agreement
was substituted whereby the attorney would look to the wife, rather than
the husband; 3. that a public sale of the assets could be held to enforce
this lien. The Robertson case should be compared with the Brasch case.13'
In Brasch the parties were divorced. Years later the wife retained an
attorney (under a contingent fee retainer contract) to enforce her rights
under the divorce dccree and to obtain an accounting. The ex-husband
and ex-wife settled their diffcrences by entering into an agreement securing
the rights granted to her under the decree together with an accounting.
rflle attorney and the cx-wife then entered into a new employment contract
which superseded the first. Subsequently, the ex-wife dismissed her attorney.
However, he refused to be dismissed as counsel and continued on with the
suit, being awarded attorney's fees by the court. The district court held
that the amount of the attorney's fees under the contract could not be
determined in the chancc, proceedings, but only in a proceeding on the
law side of the court. In Robertson, a fee for her attorney, if allowed
would have been payable by the husband to the wife's attorney directly,'1
and in addition the court would have determined the amount which could
perhaps be based upon the amount fixed in the agreement. In addition, all
of the husband's assets were turned over to the wife and there was an
implied agreement after this transfer that the attorney should look to the
wife for payment. In Brasch, the husband would not be liable to the wife's
attorney for fees and the wife's liability for payment of the fees and the
amount of the fees could only be decided on the law side of the court.
It would appear as a result of these two cases, that if the husband is liable
for the fees, the chancery court can establish the amount. If the wife
receives all or most of the husband's assets and her attorney's fees "would
necessarily have to be paid out of the assets thus obtained," the fee can
be set by the chancery court. However, if the wife alone is liable for her
attorney's fees pursuant to a contract, then the law side of the court must
adjudicate the amount.
130. Robertson v. Robertson, 106 So.2d 590 (Fla. App. 1958).
131. Brasch v. Brasch, 109 So.2d 584 (Ma. App. 1959).
132. FLA. STAT. § 65.09 (1957).
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CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
CUs'ToDY
No jurisdiction over non-resident child and custodian of child.
A Florida final decree of divorce gave custody of children to the
mother, but later custody was awarded to the paternal grandparents who
resided in Ohio. The grandparents seemingly surrendered the children to
the father in Ohio. The wife petitioned for a change of custody and a copy
of the rule nisi was served in Ohio. The supreme court found' 33 that the
trial court did not retain jurisdiction of the cause and the extraterritorial
service did not give the court jurisdiction over the respondents under the
doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff.134 Justice Thornal in his concurring opinion
stated that the Pennoyer case was not in point, but that the case was
controlled by the facts that neither the children nor the person to whom
custody had been awarded was within the state of Florida and therefore
the case was controlled by the rule of Dorman v. Friendly.18 6
When the child and the father were domiciled in Florida, the Alabama
courts had no jurisdiction to change custody of the child, and Florida
need not, of course, accord full faith and credit to the Alabama decree.3 6
A Parent has a "God-given legal right" to custody of his children.
The case of State v. Reeves 37 made its second appearance before the
supreme court and the court while affirming the lower court which refused
to make a change in custody from the maternal grandparents to the father,
in effect told the father "to renew his application for custody of his children
at an early date consistent with their welfare." The court cited the Bible
as one of two sources for the proposition that "a parent has a natural God-
given legal right to enjoy the custody, fellowship and companionship of
his offspring." Of course, once the court used the word "right" it had to
tailor its opinion accordingly and stated, "once the father's ability reaches
adequacy, his legal right should not be overcome by the fact that the
respondents' offerings may be more adequate than his, or that they may
continually out-do him, at least in material matters." The court concluded
by stating:
It is the spirit and intent of this opinion that if, since the order of
July 20, 1956, the appellant [father] has continued to demonstrate
a continuity of the conduct evidenced at the last hearing, then his
legal right to his children should be recognized, the equities other-
wise being equal.
133. Dailke v Dahlke, 97 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1957).
134. Pennoyer v, Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
135. Dona v. Friendly, 146 Ha, 732, 1 So.2d 734 (1941).
136. State v. Kuhl, 103 So.2d 225 (Fla. App. 1958).
137. State v. Reeves, 96 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1957) and 81 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1955). For
another case which approved this concept of a "'God givein legal right" see Johns v.
Jlohs, 108 Su.2d 784 (Ma. App. 1959).
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It is submitted that this case is a compounding of errors. In the
original case, if the court had followed the dissenting view of Justice Drew,
the necessity for the new petition and this appeal would have been obviated.
In addition, the court's order affirming the lower court is in the next breath
counteracted by, in effect, telling the lower court to give custody to the
father when he files a new petition-a further expensive court hearing
ordered in the name of arid formalism.
There can be no modifications in support decrees unless issue was properly
presented.
In the much cited Cortina case 38 the father filed a contempt proceed-
ing against the mother alleging that she had refused to comply with the
reasonable visitation privileges contained in a divorce decree. The chancellor
heard the testimony and sua sponte amended the custody decree by revoking
the support provision for the daughter which would be reinstated when
the mother and daughter complied with the visitation provisions of the
decree. The supreme court reversed and stated that the chancellor had no
power to amend unless the issue of modification was presented in an appro-
priate proceeding and each party was given an opportunity to be heard
on the issue of modification. The court refused to rule on the question of
whether modifications could be made in a contempt proceeding if the
pleadings raised the issue. After the remand of this case, the father
petitioned to be relieved of making support payments because he was
destitute and because he had been denied visitation rights to see his
daughter. The district court affirmed a1 the chancellor who ordered a suspen-
sion of support payments until visitations were allowed to him by the
mother and daughter. The court cautioned that the father does not have
an absolute right to visit his child; this "right" may be curtailed for "various
sociological, psychiatric and other reasons .... " which apparently were not
involved in this case.
Custody rights can be adjudicated in habeas corpus proceedings.
The district court ruled that in a habeas corpus proceeding between
the father and the maternal grandparents, the court has the power to
consider and adjudicate the question of granting temporary custody or
visitation rights to the grandparents during the summers.1 40
In another habeas corpus proceeding, the district court affirmed an
award of custody of a minor granddaughter to her grandmother because
of the mother's "intemperate use of alcohol, and failure to show a
proper interest in the minor's welfare.' 4 1
138. Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1957).
139. Cortina v. Cortina, 108 So.2d 63 (1Fla. App. 1959).
140. Martens v. State, 100 So.2d 440 (Fla. App. 1958).
141. Mattison v. State, 107 So.2d 747 (Fla. App. 1959).
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A successor chancellor has no authority to reverse the original chancellor
when re-hearing is merely a reargument of the original testimony.
In the Epperson case' 42 the supreme court reaffirmed the rule that
when a petition for re-hearing is merely a reargument of points and
facts considered by the original chancellor, a successor has no authority
to reverse the original chancellor. The court also frowned upon the
filing of a petition for modification less than four months after a prior
custody decree. Finally the court stated that when a daughter 18 years
old expresses a desire to live with her mother, and the three boys, ages
16, 12 and 7, express a desire to live with their father, the lower court
should give great weight to these desires.
Custody contest between uncles.
In a custody contest between a paternal aunt and uncle and a
maternal aunt and uncle where the home environments were approximately
equal, except that one was rural and one urban, the court upheld the
chancellor in continuing the custody of the child with the rural paternal
aunt and uncle. The case involved questions of fact rather than law.143
Divided custody provisions changed when child became emotionally upset.
In another factually sterile case, the district court affirmed the
chancellor who ordered that the father was not to have custody of the
child during the months of July and August (which had been ordered
by a prior divorce decree) when the child became six years of age.
It appears that the decision was based upon the fact that the child became
"highly excited, nervous and emotionally upset" when she had visited her
father prior to her sixth birthday. 4
4
Children can be removed from the state unless custody decree forbids it.
If a divorce decree is devoid of a requirement that the mother must
keep the children in this state, she is free to move from the state and
take her children with her. Therefore, it was erroneous for a chancellor
to hold a mother in contempt and to order that she had forfeited her
right to alimony when she moved to California because it apparently
142. Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1958). The Epperson case should
be compared with the case of Montgomery v. Montgomery, 110 So.2d 39 (Fla. App.
1959), which affirmed a custody decree but stated: "This order is without prejudice
to the wife to apply to the chancellor for a re-consideration of the order hereby affirmed
in the light of the contention that she has refrained from the use of alcohol since
December, 1956. If this fact is established to the chancellor's satisfaction and if the
mother in other respects is qualified to have the custody of said child, on reconsideration,
he may desire to alter the custodial order in the light of present conditions and what is
then to the best interest of the minor child."
143. Marsh v, Marsh. 105 So.2d 507 (Fla. App. 1958).
144. Wertheimer v. Wertheimer, 108 So.2d 58 (Fla. App. 1959).
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was not an "arbitrary or capricious" denial of visitation privileges to the
father. Visitation privileges can be protcected by a proper order of court
made in compliance with the wording of the final decree of divorce.'
Legislation.
A provision was added to the divorce statutes authorizing a chancellor
to request the State Welfare Department to make an "investigation and
social study" concerning children and "cach parent" when the custody
of a minor is in issue. The report and recommendations must be in
writing and "the technical rules of evidence shall not exclude such report
from consideration by the court." The statute unfortunately makes no
provision for disclosure of this report to the parties or their counsel.
Perhaps this is another example of cases being "tried" outside of the
courtroom.'"
SUPPORT
Scope of contempt hearings.
'['he district court has held that a rule requiring a divorced husband
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to
make support payments is sufficient notice authorizing the chancellor to
reduce the arrearages to a judgment and allowing execution to issue. The
court stated that the chancellor had to determine the amount of the
arrearages in order to enter the judgment, hence the husband was not
misled to his prejudice.'47 It is submitted that the husband had little
to complain about; a judgment is certainly less burdensome (in the
average case) than being confined to jail for contempt.
In accord with the theory of the Cortina case,' 48 the district court
ruled that when the wife filed a motion for an order to show cause for
delinquent child support payments and the husband at the hearing filed
a petition for modification of future payments and testimony was received
on this modification petition, it was error for the chancellor to order a
reduction. The wife, by not having any prior notice that this petition
was to be heard, was denied an adequate opportunity to present testi-
mony. The court did not state how much advance notice is required
in order to afford the opposing party "an opportunity to be heard on
such issue.""149
It was erroneous for a chancellor to enter a contempt order confining
a father for a fixed period of time for failure to make support payments.
Tie contempt order should have contained a finding of the amount of
145. Bell v. Bell, 112 So.2d 63 (Ma. App. 1959).
146. FLA. STAT. § 65.21 (1959), created by ch. 59-186, I.B. No. 332, 37th General
Session, Florida (1959).
147. Taylor v. Taylor, 97 So,2d 35 (Fla. App. 1957).
148. Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So.2d 334 (0a. 1957), note 138, suPra.
149. Ray v. Ray, 99 So.Zd 721 (Fla. App. 1958).
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arrearages and provided that he could purge himself of the contempt by
paying the amount of the arrearages. 150
A cash bond can be required of father to guarantee compliance with the
provisions of a divided custody decree.
The Metz case' 51 decided that: 1. a fattier had the right to remove
his child from the state during the time that he had custody (pursuant
to a divided custody decree), but that this right was conditioned upon
the posting of a cash bond to defray the expenses of bringing the child
back to Florida if the father failed to do so. The court stated that this
bond should be deposited in the registry of the court rather than with
the attorney for the wife; 2. that under Section 65.16 of the Florida
Statutes, the wife was entitled to attorney's fees in her contesting of the
husband's application for divided custody because the word "'enforcing'
should be given a broad and liberal interpretation."
Amount of a child support award can be based upon father's net worth,
rather than current income.
In Dworkis,'12 the district court, on re-hearing, increased a support
award for an eleven year old boy from $15 to $30 per week. The
father was possessed of property worth $114,000 with a yearly income
of approximately $5,000. Tle fact that the mother "possessed all the
indications of wealth" would not relieve (in whole or in part) the father's
duty to support his child, even though his ability to pay was measured
by his net worth rather than current income.
Appellate determination of support amounts.
In accord with the Brooks'" and Morton1' 4 cases, the district court
decided that when the husband has superseded a final decree which
provides for child support payments, the appellate court can order the
same amount (as provided in the lower court) in the absence of any
other facts upon which th appellate court can predicate a different
finding. 5.-
Construction of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law.
In a case of first impression, a Florida resident was ordered extradited
to the State of Illinois to answer a criminal charge of nonsupport of his
minor child and the father initiated habeas corpus proceedings to contest
150. Dykes v. Dykes, 104 So.2d 598 (Fla. App. 1958).
151. Metz v. Metz, 108 So.2d 512 (Fla. App. 1959).
152. Dworkis v. Dworkis, 11 So.2d 70 (Fla. App. 1959).
153. Brooks v. Brooks, 100 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1958).
154. Morton v. Morton, 104 So2d 472 (FIa. App. 1958).
155. McKenzie v. McKenzie, 105 So2d 614 (Fla. App. 1958).
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the extradition. The supreme court ruled: (1). that Section 88.071 of
th Florida Statutes (the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law)
does not require that a civil enforcement proceeding be initiated in the
demanding state (Illinois) before extradition may be made; a criminal
enforcement proceeding is sufficient; (2) that a person about to be extra-
dited may relieve himself from extradition by voluntarily submitting himself
to a court of competent jurisdiction and complying with such court's order as
to the amount of support he should pay to the obligee.156
Legislation.
Section 856.04 of the Florida Statutes which forbids the desertion by
a husband of his wife and children or the withholding of support from
them, or either of them, or the deserting by a mother of her children or
the withholding of support of them, was amended by increasing the penalty
(from one year's imprisonment in the state prison or by a fine not to
exceed one thousand dollars) to a maximum penalty of two years'
imprisonment, or two thousand dollars fine. The remainder of the section
provides for a method of posting a bond, before or after conviction, which
will result in the release of the husband or wife.5 7
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law was amended
to provide that foreign support orders may be registered upon petition
by the obligec. If the obligor defaults, the circuit court shall enter an
order confirming the registered support order and determining the amounts
remaining unpaid. The support order, as confirmed, shall have the same
effect and may be enforced as if originally entered in Florida."'
Dependent Children.
Section 409.18 of the Florida Statutes relating to eligibility for aid to
dependent children was amended. Space does not permit any discussion
of the amendments."39
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
Adjudication of property rights in separate maintenance proceedings.
A tenancy by the entirety may exist in personal property. Therefore,
when a husband sold property and took back a purchase money mortgage
payable to himself and his wife and a year later the mortgage was paid
in full, there was a presumption that the husband made a gift of one-half
156. Jackson v. lal, 97 So.2d t (Fla. 1957).
157. FIA. STAT. § 856.04 (1957) as amended by el. 59-147, 11.B. No. 454, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959)
158. FLA. STAT. § 88.321 (1959), as added by ch. 59-393, S.B. No. 525, 37th
General Session. Florida (1959).
159. FLA. STAT. § 409.18 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-202, 11.B. No. 312, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
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interest to the wife and she was therefore entitled to one-half of the
payment, the property rights to be adjudicated in a separate maintenance
action.160
However, the same district court in the Naurison case decided that
it was improper in an action for alimony unconnected with divorce to
give the wife an undivided one-half interest in the marital home, held as
an estate by the entireties, and equitable ownership of eleven shares of
corporate stock held in the name of the husband. It is submitted that
these cases are utterly irreconcilable.16'
Constructive service not applicable in suits for alimony unconnected
with divorce.
In a suit brought under Section 65.09 for alimony unconnected with
divorce, service of process by publication under chapter 48 of the Florida
Statutes will not give the court jurisdiction. Section 48.01 (4) provides
for service of process in cases "For divorce or annulment of marriage,"
which cannot be interpreted to apply to actions for alimony unconnected
with divorce.162
Liability for, and amounts of separate maintenance awards.
Under Section 65.10 of the Florida Statutes it was error to enter a
decree of separate maintenance absent a showing that the husband was
able to support the wife, but "nevertheless fails to support or withholds it."' a3
The Platt case 64 (which was based primarily on disputed questions
of fact rather than law) held that while an award of $350 per month
as separate maintenance to the wife may be "ample, if not somewhat
generous," it did not constitute an abuse of discretion by the chancellor.
The husband owned a motor court worth approximately $30,000 from
which he received a net income of $100 per month. In addition the husband
owned realty (mainly vacant lots) worth $9,500 and had earned, for a
period of four months, the sum of $600 per month as an automobile
salesman. The husband contended that he had lost this employment
and his present net income did not exceed $140 per month. Assuming
that the husband's defense was even partly true, the writer is forced to
agree that the award was "somewhat generous."
In the first hearing of the Bredin case,'6 5 the supreme court reversed
the chancellor by holding that in a separate maintenance proceeding, the
courts have no power to make a lump sum alimony award. The court
160. Lauderdale v. Lauderdale, 96 So.2d 663 (Fla. App. 1957).
161. Naurison v. Naurison, 108 So.2d 510 (Fla. App. 1959),
162. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 101 So,2d 608 (Mla. App. 1958).
163. Perry v. Perry, 97 So2d 152 (Fla. App. 1957).
164. Platt v. Platt, 103 So.2d 253 (1a. App. 1958).
165. Bredin v. Bredin, 89 So.2d 353 (VIa. 1956).
19591
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
further stated that the wife had established her entitlement to separate
maintenance which should be based on her need and the husband's
ability to pay. Upon remand, the chancellor misunderstood the supreme
court's mandate and refused to allow the husband to introduce any new
testimony relative to a decrease in his earnings and a betterment in his
wife's financial position occurring since the final decree. hlie husband
appealed and the court held that the parties should be permitted to intro-
duce testimony showing any substantial changes in the financial status of
the parties subsequent to the entry of the final decree.' 6
Although appellate courts are reluctant to disturb the amount of
an alinony award, the district court reduced a separate maintenance
award from $3,000 per month to $2,200 per month after a "realistic
appraisal of the record. ..... Tile court mentioned that it is more
expensive to support two homes than one; that tle wife's former monthly
allowance was $1,800 per month plus moneys for household expenses,
automobiles, furs, etc. may have influenced the chancellor in awarding her
$3,000 per month.107 It is submitted that reversing the chancellor because
of a "realistic appraisal of the record," without detailing the method of
arriving at the figure of $2,200, is not very helpful to the chancellor or
to the legal profession.
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
Property rights vested under a property settlement cannot be modified;
while alimony provisions may be modified.
A separation and property setlement agreement provided that the
husbancd would maintain a life insurance policy with his wife as beneficiary
and his children as alternate beneficiaries and would do no acts which
would impair tle efficacy of the policy. riis agreement was made a part
of a final decree of divorce. Subsequently, the chancellor upon petition
by tle husband, changcd the effect of the agreemcnt by providing that
the wife should be trustee of the policy for the children and that when
the children reached their majority, the insurance policy would become the
sole property of the husband. The district court reversed stating that
this provision was a right in property which became vested by the contract,
and contracts of this type cannot he altered or modified except as would
be allowable between strangers, particularly where the contract has been
ratified and confirmed by a court.'Y8 The distinguishing point remains
that if the provision is a settlement of property rights between the parties
166. Bredin v. Bredin, 103 So.ld 879 (Ma. 1958).
167. Guilden v. Guilden, 104 So.2d 737 (Fla. App. 1958), In Stigehbaur v. Stigelbaur,
105 So.2d 584 (Mla. App. 1958), the court without discussing the facts, merely
reiterated the rule that since no error of the chancellor was shown, the decree niust be
affirmed.
168. Sedcl v. Sedell, 100 So.2d 639 (Fla. App. 1958).
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it cannot be altered; if it merely provides for support and alimony rights
it may be altered upon sufficient showing. This distinction was abstrusely
developed in the Blunda case.18" A husband and wife agreed in a separation
and property settlement agreement that the husband would contribute
$250.00 per month for the support of the wife and children. Years after
the divorce, the husband filed a petition to have the chancellor allocate
the amounts due to the wife and the amounts due to the children who
had since reached their majority. The court stated that this agreement
"was a combined arrangement for care of the wife and children and a
settlement of the property interests of the signatories. The attainment of
majority by the children was not mentioned as a condition which would
effect a change in the remittances." Therefore, the court refused to
disturb the agreement by making any allocation of amounts between the
mother and the children.
This distinction was more clearly expressed in the Kroll case.' 70 After
an "Alice in Wonderland" procedural journey through the lower court, the
chancellor modified a property settlement agreement (which originally pro-
vided that the husband was to havesole ownership of property previously
held as a tenancy by the entirety) by providing that the real property was
to be held by the father as trustee for his minor children, the trust to
terminate upon their reaching their majority. The district court held that
Section 65.15 of the Florida Statutes provides for modification of property
settlement agreements only as to "provisions for support, maintenance and
alimony" and none of these were present here. In addition the court
criticised the chancellor's sna sponte raising of this trust without giving
the husband an opportunity to be heard.
The Fowler case further illustrates this dichotomy between a modifica-
tion of alimony and "property rights." An agreement whereby the husband
agreed to continue payment of premiums on life insurance policies payable
to the wife as beneficiary "was part of the property settlement, and is
not subjct to modification in a proceeding brought under F.S. Section
65.15, F.S.A." The claim of the husband that because of his wife's
"invidious and vindictive" actions lie was forced to sell his laundry business
and was therefore unable to continue alimony payments in the agreed
amount, was summarily brushed aside. Assuming that the wife was guilty
of this conduct, it would still not justify a reduction in alimony payments.
The test is the husband's "financial incapacity" to pay, or that "it is
beyond the husband's capacity to pay from his present resources the amount
of alimony fixed in the divorce decree" pursuant to his voluntary agreement.
To summarize, Section 65.15 of the Florida Statutes refers to modifications
of final decrees of divorce which relate to support, maintenance or alimony.
Therefore, a property settlement agreement which is limited solely to
169. Blunda v, Blunda, 101 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1958).
170. Kroll v. Kroll, 105 So.2d 495 (Fla. App. 1958).
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questions of the division of property owned by the spouses is not subject
to modification by the court.'
Provisions of a separation agreement may render father's estate liable
for support of minor children.
The Florida Supreme Court has previously ruled 7 2 that when a
property settlement provided that weekly support payments to the wife
were to be terminated only by her death or remarriage, the ex-husband's
obligation for the payments did not terminate with his death and his
estate remained liable until the death or remarriage of the ex-wife. The
district court considered this case as analogous and decided that when
the separation agreement provided for child support "until each child
respectively shall have reached the age of eighteen years," this obligation
also survived the death of the father and was a charge against his estate.
The court noted that a court order for support terminates with the death
of the father.'"
ADOPTION
Potential conflict between "juvenile" courts and circuit courts over adoptions
not decided.
In the case of Ponce v. Children's Honze Society of Florida,7 4 the
juvenile Court of Dade County temporarily committed an infant to the
Children's Home Society while retaining jurisdiction over the cause. The
society placed the child with a couple who were agents and employees
of the Children's Home. Later the children were removed and the couple
petitioned for adoption of the child in the circuit court. The supreme
court held: 1. That the usual rule that an agent cannot acquire an interest
in the subject matter of the agency would not apply to the present facts.
2. That since the juvenile court was not attempting to exercise any adoption
jurisdiction, there was no constitutional question to be decided as to
whether the juvenile court did have jurisdiction over adoptions. 3. That
the circuit court had jurisdiction over the matter, but it should not
exercise this power until the juvenile court had made a permanent commit-
ment of the child to a licensed child placing agency or relinquished
jurisdiction.
171. Fowler v. Fowler. 112 So.2d 411 (Fla. App. 19591. See also: Strozier v.
Strozier, 107 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1958). In Hunter v. Hunter, 108 So.2d 478 (Fla. App.
1959), the court, after a thorough examinltion of the agreement, decided that the
agreement was to pay sums in lieu of alimony rather than a property settlement, hence
it was subject to modification upon petition by the ex-wife.
172. lohnson v. Every, 93 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1957). Sec Note, Divorce-Liability of
the Husband's Estate to 'Pay Alimony, XIII U. MIAMI L. R.v. 378 (1959).
173. Simpson v. Simpson, 108 So.2d 632 (Fla. App. 1959).
174. Ponce v. Children's Home Society of Florida, 97 So.2d 194 (Fla. 19571.
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Illustration of the dichotomy between adoption and custody.
Although the findings of a chancellor are to be accorded "a full
measure of presumptive correctness," the supreme court seemingly had no
alternative but to reverse an adoption order which took children away
from their mother when her alleged indifference to their welfare was not
(according to the findings of the chancellor) per se sufficient to support
the decree and when her alleged immoral conduct terminated in a marriage
with a substantial individual. It is submitted that the somewhat strange
wording of the adoption decree was an invitation for reversal. 1" After
the remiind of this case, the chancellor misunderstood the supreme court's
mandate by believing that it meant he could take no further testimony.
He therefore ordered the children delivered to their mother. The supreme
court stated that its former opinion concluded only the question of
adoption, it did not decide the question of custody. Therefore, the chancellor
had the power to consider the evidence and arirve at a proper decision
as to the future custody of the children. 70 It is submitted that in cases
of this type, it is a mistake to create a dichotomy between adoption and
custody and to require hearings on each issue. If the chancellor awards
the custody of the children to others, it would be an empty victory for
the mother who may have her children in a legal sense but not in a factual
sense. It is also submitted that because of the obscure wording of the
original opinion, the chancellor's "misunderstanding" was perfectly natural.
"Abandonment" by the natural parents as a major influencing factor
in adoption cases.
The Hamilton case' (which seems to be incorrectly reported as to
the alignment of the justices) simply held as a factual matter that: where a
natural mother delivered her child to the adopting parent when the child
was nineteen months old; the natural mother had virtually abandoned the
child for six years; the father had expressed no objection to the adoption;
the minor now eight years old expressed a desire to stay with the adopting
parent (her aunt), it was erroneous for the chancellor to deny the
petition. In accord with the "abandonment" features of the foregoing
case is the Wiggins case' 78 which held that when the natural father had
maintained as close a contact and relationship (support, gifts, affection,
etc.) as was permitted by the fact that his divorced wife had custody
and had remarried, he should not be deprived of his daughter, and a
decree of adoption in favor of the stepfather was reversed. The lengthy
case of In re De Walt's Adoption'7 (which again reversed the chancellor)
175. Torres v. Van Eepoel, 98 So.2d 735 (Fa. 1957).
176. Van Eepoel v. Justice, 104 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1958).
177. Hamilton v. Rose, 99 So.2d 234 ('a. 1957).
178. Wiggins v. Rolls, 100 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1958).
179. DeWalt v. DeWalt, 101 So.2d 915 (Ha. App. 1958).
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further illustrates the "abandonment" rule of the foregoing cases. The district
court held: 1. That when a circuit court of one county giants custody
of a child and subsequently that child and his custodian remove to
another county, the circuit court of the second county does have
jurisdiction over adoption proceedings. Thc theory being that the adoption
proccedings caused the child to cease to sustain any relationship to its
natural parents; it was withdrawn as a part of the res of the custody
proccding. 2. That the finding of the first circuit court that the mother
was unfit to have custody of her child together with other allegations
satisfied the requirements of Sections 72.08 and 72.12 of the Florida
Statutes. 3. That Section 72.07 which describes children subject to
adoption is not all inclusive or exclusive, and even though the child
had not been abandoned by his natural parents, he may still be the
suhject matter of adoption proceedings. 4. That a natural parent should
not be dcprivcd of the "right" to her child unless she has abandoned
her offspring or has othcrwisc demonstrated that she is not a fit subject
to continue to enjoy the "privilegc." The co-mingling of the terms
"right" and "privilge" in these adoption cases seems somewhat incon-
sistent and illogical.
The Modacsi case,'8 0 is a full development of this dichotomy. The
natural mother placed her son in the custody of her parents in West
Virginia. Later the mother marricd and some difficulty arose between
her and her parents over her son. The West Virginia court awarded
custody of the child to the grandparents. The child was delivered to
his mother and she, her husband and her child moved to Florida. The
Florida court, without notice to the grandparents in West Virginia, entered
an order of adoption in favor of the stepfather. The grandparents instituted
the instant action in Florida for custody and the lower court awarded
them custody. The district court reversed, holding that there was no
statutory requirement of notice to the grandparents in West Virginia.
The \Vest Virginia decree was concerned solely with custodial rights
of the parties as of that date; while adoption is an entirely separate
proceeding "unconnected with and not controlled by prior custody awards."
Therefore, the question as to whether "the West Virginia order is entitled
by comity to full faith and credit" was not involved. It is submitted
that the decision is correct. 1-lowevcr, the mixing of the terms "comity"
with "full faith and credit" seems erroneous.
The abandonment rule was further illustrated in the case of Roy v.
Holmes."" A ten-month old child was placed in the custody of a couple
by the child's parents because they were unable to care for it due to
their illness. The natural parents permitted the custody to continue for
180. Modacsi v. Taylor, 104 So.2d 664 (Fla. App. 1958).
181. Roy v. Holmes, Ill '-'-1 468 (Fla. App. 1959), in accord with Torres v.
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over four years, during which time the natural father was almost com-
plctely derelict in supporting the child. The lower court found an.
abandonment of the child by his natural parents and entered a decree
of adoption in favor of the couple which had custody of the child.
The district court reversed by holding that except in cases of clear,
convincing and compelling reasons to the contrary, the child's welfare
is presumed to bc best served by care and custody in the natural family
relation by its natural parents. Although "transitory failures and derelic-
tions of tle parents might justify temporary deprivation of custody by
appropriate proceeding but seldom the permanent deprivation of parental
rights with the finality of an adoption decree."
Consent to adoption which has been freely given, may not be withdrawn.
Where consent to adoption had been "executed voluntarily with
knowledge of the effect thereof, with no fraud, duress, or undue influence
being practiced on the mother," her consent may not be withdrawn. 182
GUARDIANSHIP
Fees for guardians and attorneys allowable when guardianship
proceedings are involved.
In a case of apparent first impression,1'8 3 the supreme court has ruled
that a guardian of the property of a ward is entitled to reasonable
compensation for services rendered in good faith even though it later
develops that the guardianship proceedings were a nullity. The same
rule also applies to attorneys for the guardian. The compensation for
the guardian must be based on what is just and reasonable for services
rendered rather than on a percentage of the value of the estate. The
compensation for the attorneys for the guardian must also be fixed on
quantum neruit or a quid pro quo basis.
After the lapse of five years, a county judge revoked orders which
had approved the guardian's final returns and had discharged him from
his duties as guardian. The surety for the guardian filed a petition for
certiorari with the circuit court which seemingly dismissed the petition
because the order of the county judge had not become final. The district
court affirmed the order of the circuit court apparently because it was
reluctant to prejudge what ruling the county judge would make at the
hearing on his order.18 4 It is to wondered why the court "side-stepped"
consideration of Section 746.14 of the Florida Statutes which places a
Van Eepoel, 98 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1957).
182. Skcn v. Marx, 105 So.2d 517 (Fla. App. 1958).
183. Lucorn v. Atlantic National Bank of 'West Paln Beach, 97 So.2d 478(Fla. 1957).
184. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Davis, 97 So.2d 715 (Fla. App. 1957).
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one year limitation on suits against the guardian or his surety. Did not
this case involve a question of law rather than fact?
When a county judge enters an order discharging the guardian
(and his surety) and rules that the question of attorney's fees (for the
attorney who rendered services to the guardian and his ward) are to
be decided by the county judge of another county, it closes the case.
Hence, it is a final order which must be appealed from within the usual
sixty day period if an appeal is to be properly taken. This rule may not
be circumvented by the attorney filing a "motion to vacate" after the
appeal time has expired.18
Testamentary guardian of person derives apointment front will,
not from order of appointment.
In another case of first impression, the supreme court ruled that
under Sections 744.03 (4), 744.14 and 744.35, of the Florida Statutes,
when a deceased appointed a guardian of the persons of his surviving
children, "that whatever may be required of a testamentary guardian
in the way of qualification before the court, he derives his powers by
appointment of the testator and not by appointment of the court."
Therefore, a petition by third parties to oust the testamentary guardian
must contain allegations of his unfitness to be guardian because it is a
question of "ouster," rather than his qualifications for an original appoint-
ment. The court made mention of the fact that under Section 744.14,
a testator has no power to appoint a guardian of the property of his child.8 6
Recourse against incompetent maker of promissory note.
When an incompetent executed a note and mortgage to his attorneys
for services rendered the note would be voidable as between the parties.
This voidability could be asserted against an alleged holder in due course.
However, when this holder paid for the note and mortgage and these
proceeds were used to pay the attorneys for services performed for the
incompetent, then the holder is entitled to recover to the extent to
which the incompetent maker benefited.' 8 '
Attorneys fees in curatorship proceedings.
The cause celebre of Gay v. MeCaughan'Il involved a curatorship
rather than a guardianship. However, the court drew on the rules of
guardianship as analogies for its decision. The main point was that if a
185. In re Guardianship of Straitz, 112 So.2d 889 (Fla. App. 1959).
186. Comerford v. Cherry, 100 So.2d 385 (fla. 1958).
187. Machtei v. Campbell, 102 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1958).
188. Gay v. Mcaughan, 105 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1958). For further proceedings see
Gay v. Ieller, 108 So.2d 610 (Fla. App. 1959).
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client retains legal counsel to prosecute a curatorship proceeding, only
the estate of the ward seems to be liable for counsel fees, not the client.
However, even assuming liability of the client for the fees, the amount
can only be adjudicated in adversary proceedings, not in the curatorship
proceeding itself.
Election to take dower is not an absolute right of the guardian of an
incompetent widow.
A widow has an absolute right to elect to take dower when she
herself makes the election. However, when she is incompetent the election
of dower made by her guardian in her behalf is not an absolute right
because, under Section 731.35(2) of the Florida Statutes, "the county
judge shall grant or deny such election as the best interest of the widow
may require." (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, the supreme court
affirmed an order of the county judge denying such an election because
a detailed examination of the assets of the deceased and the widow;
her advanced age; and the terms of the trust created by the deceased
disclosed that it was not in her best interests to have dower set aside
for her. 8 9 This case was obviously in the minds of the legislature when
it amended Section 731.35 of the Florida Statutes to give the widow
an additional period of sixty days in which to file her election of dower
in the event that a will contest is filed (either as to its construction or
validity), or if the county judge extends the time for the filing of claims
by creditors, or if any claim be contested. The sixty day period begins
to run from the date to which such extension for filing claims is extended,
or from the date of a final judgment determining any litigation or con-
tested claim, or from the time allowed to the personal representative for
filing his objections to any claim. Subsection (3) was repealed and a
new subsection added which seems to be a clear statement of the rationale
of the case of Edwards v. Edwards, supra. °00
A curator may be appointed even though incompetent is not actually insane.
It is not necessary that a person be actually insane or mentally ill
before a curator can be appointed to manage his or her estate. A curator
can be appointed when a person has "become physically incapacitated...
or so mentally or physically defective by reason of age. . ." that he is
unable to take care of his property and is likely to dissipate or loose it,
or become the victim of a designing person.'
189. Edwards v. Edwards, 106 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1958).
190. FLA. STAT. § 731.35 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-123, S.B. No. 287, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
191. Davis v. Carter, 107 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1958).
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Prohibition can be used to attack the jurisdiction of the county judge's
court predicated upon improper service of process.
The Florida Statutes192 require that service of process in incompetency
hearings be made either by an official of the state or by any person by
a delivery of a true copy of the notice or citation to the alleged incompetent
and one or more members of his family. Hence, service of notice by
registered mail was not a compliance with the law. In addition, the
statute1 3 requires that the time and place of the hearing be specified
in the notice or citation. Tlerefore, a citation which stated that the,
"Time and Place To Be Determined by the Doctors," was improper in
that it "can only be deemed an abdication by the court of its duties and an
abrogation of the protective function of the notice." Finally, the alleged
incompetent need not contest the jurisdiction of the court through an
appeal, but may directly attack the proceedings by a writ of prohibition.1 '
Legislation.
Section 394.22(12) of the Florida Statutes ("Mental Health" Law)
was amended to provide for the appointment of a "temporary guardian
of the property" of a person who has been temporarily hospitalized or
confined for mental incompetency. The guardian's duties and his discharge
are to be governed by the general guardianship laws.1'"
JUVENILES AND JUVENILE COURTS
Jurisdiction of "dependent chiddren"--juvenile courts vis-a-vis
circuit courts.
The case of State Department of iblic Welfare v. Galilean
Children's Home""6 is another effort to clear the maze in the conflicting
and overlapping statutes concerning the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts
vis-a-vis the circuit courts. The district court held that Section 409.05
of the Florida Statutes which requires all child-caring institutions that
care for "dependent" children to have a license issued by the Department
of Public Welfare is valid, and that the Department may apply to a
court of equity for an injunction for a violation of this section. rhis is so
despite the fact that Section 39.02 (1) of the Florida Statutes states
that, "The juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of
dependent and delinquent children. .. " (Emphasis added.) The court
stated that the Rogers case""7 limited the effect of Section 39.02(1) to
192. FiA. S'r,v. §§ 394.22(4) (1957) and 744.29(4) (1891).
193. FLA. SrAT. § 394.22(4) (1957).
194, Rehrer v. Veeks, 106 So.2d 865 (Fla. App. 1958).
195. FIA. S'rA. § 394.22(12) (1957), as amended by ch. 59-42, H.B. No. 378, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
196. State Department of Public Welfare v. Glilean Children's llome, 102 So.2d
388 (Fla. App. 1958).
197. State ex rel. Watson v. Rogers, 86 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1956).
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"those minors involved in criminality or delinquency," hence the two
statutes must be so construed as to make both operational, therefore,
the equity court had jurisdiction. As the court indicated, in order to
carry out the injunctive process, the equity court would have to be
utilized because the "relief sought could not be obtained in juvenile
court. .. ." (sic).
Standards governing juvenile courts in deciding custody questions
of "dependent" children.
The district court ruled that when a child has been adjudged to
be dependent or deiinquent and his custody awarded to others than his
natural parents, the juvenile court is not hound "forthwith" to restore
his custody to his parents when they make a showing of "fitness, ability
and willingness to assume their parental responsibilities." Once the child
has been made a ward of the state, a broad discretion is in the juvenile
court to rule in the best interests of the child. The court refused to
define the area of the juvenile court's discretion, the only indication was
that, "Evidence that may be totally inadequate to deprive a parent of the
custody of his child in the first instance may be altogether adequate to
support the court's refusal to restore custody to the parent once the
child has become a ward of the state."198
The district courts have appellate jurisdiction from juvenile courts.
The district court has construed Article V of the Florida Constitution
to mean that the district courts are the appellate courts for review of
the judgments of the juvenile courts. This interpretation was based upon
the wording that, "Appeals from trial courts in each appellate district...,"
are to be heard by the district court, and the juvenile court was considered
to be a "trial court."' 99
This view was approved by another district court in the case of
In re C.E.S3'00 which, after a thorough review of the facts, affirmed the
juvenile court in its findings that a minor child was a "dependent child"
and its awarding of custody to the uncle of the child, rather than to his
mother.
Legislation.
Section 39.03 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
when a juvenile is taken into custody, his parents (or legal custodian)
and the principal of the school in which the child is enrolled shall be
notified at the earliest practicable time.20'
198. Pendarvis v. State of Florida, 104 So.2d 651 (Fla. App. 1958).
199. State of Florida v. J. K.. 104 So.2d 113 (Fla. App. 1958).
200. State v. Brock, 106 So.2d 610 (Fla. App. 1958).
201. FLA. SlAT. § 39.03(3) (1957). as amerided by c h. 59441, H.B. No. 728, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
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ILLEGITIMACY
In a case of first impression, the district court held that in bastardy
actions brought under Section 742.011 of the Florida Statutes for periodic
payments for the support of an illegitimate child, the three year general
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of birth rather than
from the date of conception. 202
Legislation.
Section 742.031 of the "Bastardy Act" was amended to provide that
the judicially ascertained father is to pay "all taxable costs of the
proceedings." 20'
The statute of limitations was increased in bastardy proceedings so
that now an action can be brought at any time until such illegitimate
child reaches four years of age. If the defendant during the four year
period makes payments to the mother, then the four year limitation period
begins to run from the date of the last payment. 204
MISCELLANEOUS
A person standing in loco parentis to a minor "may" be liable
for the minor's torts.
A sixteen year old minor deliberately shot a neighbor's child. The
victim and his father sued the uncle of the child as standing in "loco
parcntis" to the child. The custody of the child had been awarded to
his mother by a divorce decree, but he had been living with the uncle
and his family. The district court affirmed the entry of a summary judgment
in favor of the uncle because, aside from certain conclusions made by
affiants in their affidavits, there were no facts that showed a relationship
of father and sonY0°
Legislation.
Section 232.01 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
married "children" shall not be required to attend school.20 '
Provision was made, at long last, for the care and treatment of
emotionally disturbed and psychotic children at the South Florida State
Hospital in Broward County. 07
202. Kieser v. Love, 98 So.2d 381 (Fla. App. 1957).
203. FIA. STAT. § 842.031 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-45, S.B. No. 119, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
204. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-188, 1.B. No. 551, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
205. Weig v. Ombres, 106 So.2d 614 (Fla. App. 1958).
206. FLA. STAT. § 232.01 (1957), as amended by ch. 59-412, 11.13. No. 306, 37th
General Session, Florida (1959).
207. Ch. 59-383, H.B. No. 436, 37th General Session, Florida (1959).
[VOL. XIV
